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Abstract 
 
The flux of foreign investment into the water industry led to the internationalisation of contracts 
and of the method of settlement of possible disputes. When disputes over the performance of a 
water concession give origin to investor-state arbitrations, public authorities are put in a 
challenging position. The state need to combine two different roles – its role in the provision of 
services of public interest and the fulfilment of its international legal obligations arising from 
international investment agreements. The complexity of this relationship is patent in a variety of 
procedural and substantive issues that have been surfacing in arbitration proceedings conducted 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to discuss the impact of investment arbitration on the protection of public interests 
associated with water services. In deciding these cases arbitrators are contributing significantly 
in shaping the contours and substance of an emerging international economic water services 
regime. Through the looking glass of arbitration awards one can realise the substantial 
consequences that the international investment regime has been producing on water markets and 
how significantly it has been impacting the public interests associated with water services. Due 
consideration of the public interests in water concession disputes requires concerted action in 
two different domains: changing the investment arbitration mechanism, by promoting the 
transparency of proceedings and the participation of non-parties; and changing the regulatory 
framework that underpins investments in water services. Combined, these improvements are 
likely to infuse public interests into water concession arbitrations. 
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CHAPTER I – GLOBALISATION OF THE WATER INDUSTRY 
 
1. Water: from the State to the Market 
 
The provision of urban water services has historically been considered a ‘public service’. 
The ‘public’ label resulted from the fact that these services were owned and operated by a public 
entity. From a different perspective, water services were also defined as ‘public’ because they 
were offered to the general community and perceived as vital for the satisfaction of citizens’ 
needs. Taking into account that water supply served key public interests, both ownership and 
operation were considered of strategic importance and remained strictly within the realm of the 
public sector. 
Water supply is operated through a vast physical network, from well to tap. The operation 
of this grid requires substantial technical expertise, maintenance, and investment. All over the 
world governments were faced with deteriorating water systems and the scarcity of capital to 
maintain and improve networks. Public authorities started mulling the possibility of allowing 
private participation in the provision of water services by means of different instruments known 
as Public-Private Partnerships. This concept refers to an assortment of contractual arrangements 
whereby private companies build, manage, and/or operate water infrastructures on behalf of 
governments. 1  Essentially two arguments were advanced in favour of Public-Private 
Partnerships: first, governments could attract the huge funding needed for the maintenance and 
expansion of water infrastructures; second, they could benefit from the technical and commercial 
savoir-faire of private companies.2 This shift towards the market in search of efficiency and 
sustainability was boosted by a growing discourse about water as an economic good, epitomised 
in the 1992 ‘Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development’, also known as ‘the 
Dublin Principles’.3 The statement included the principle that ‘water has an economic value in all 
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good’. This momentous change in 
the way water was understood – from a public to an economic good – was reiterated by 
                                               
1
 K. Bakker, “Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World’s Urban Water Crisis”, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010 p. xv. 
2
 See, e.g., X. Mandri-Perrott, D. Stiggers, “Public Private Partnerships in the Water Sector. Innovation and 
Financial Sustainability”, London: IWA Publishing, 2013 pp. 3 ff. 
3
 Several Authors, The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, 31 January 1992, 
available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html. 
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numerous international, multilateral and bilateral agencies, calling for significant changes in 
national regulatory frameworks so as to allow private sector participation in water services. 
Public-Private Partnerships assume varied shapes. The concession model is the most 
comprehensive form of private participation in water services provision. By means of this 
contract, the public authority (the ‘grantor’) transfers to a private company (the ‘concessionaire’) 
the commercial management of abstraction, treatment, distribution, and sale of water in a 
specific city or region. In some cases water supply is combined with the operation of the 
sewerage system. The concessionaire is responsible for the capital investments and assumes the 
full risk of operating the assets. In exchange the concessionaire is entitled to bill and collect 
payments from all customers at tariff levels agreed with the public entity.4  Normally these 
contracts have a long period of duration depending on the level of investment and the payback 
period needed for the concessionaire to recover investment costs. At the end of the contract the 
concessionaire hands back all works and equipment to the state. 
The marketisation of water management deeply transformed the role of the state in the 
provision of these services. The conclusion of concession contracts lead to an emphasis on the 
economics of private investment – the sector entered the age of ‘economization of fresh water’.5 
Nevertheless, public authorities are still required to ensure that water services are carried out in 
accordance with their essential public function. 6  The concept of ‘public service’ was not 
rendered useless as public service obligations may also be discharged under private-law 
regimes.7 The unrelieved responsibility of states for water service provision has been confirmed 
in several international documents. In August 2000 the International Council of Environmental 
Law submitted a written statement to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
arguing that ‘irrespective of the form of water service management and the degree of 
involvement of private companies in the service, the public authorities must exercise control over 
the operations of the various public or private bodies involved in water service management. 
This includes, in particular, the financing of works, the quality of the water, continuity of the 
                                               
4
 A. Nickson, R. Franceys, “Tapping the Market: The Challenge of Institutional Reform in the Urban Water Sector”, 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 pp. 73-74. 
5
  L. De Chazournes, “Fresh Water in International Law”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 p. 96. 
6
 F. Costamagna, Regulating Public Services and International Investment Law, in M. Krajewski (ed.), “Services of 
General Interest Beyond the Single Market. External and International Law Dimensions”, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2015 p. 79. 
7
 H. Wollmann, G. Marcou, Introduction, in H. Wollmann, G. Marcou (eds.), “The Provision of Public Services in 
Europe: Between State, Local Government and Market”, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010 p. 4.  
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service, pricing, drafting of specifications, degree of treatment and user participation’.8 In 2010 
the Human Rights Council reaffirmed that the delegation of the delivery of water services to a 
third party does not exempt public authorities from their obligations and called upon States to 
adopt measures to fulfil their duties.9 
The provision of water services has long been qualified as a ‘public service’. Yet, the 
concept is vague as services are organised in different ways from country to country. In the 
European Union the concept evolved to the notions of ‘Services of General Interest’ and 
‘Services of General Economic Interest’. While the former refers to services that public 
authorities classify as being of general interest and, therefore, subject to specific public service 
obligations; the latter covers economic activities which deliver outcomes in the overall public 
good that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) by the market 
without public intervention.10 Specific requirements – known as ‘public service obligations’ – 
are imposed on service providers relating to security of supply, regularity, quality and price of 
supplies, and environmental protection.11 
Because of its association with public interests, the provision of water services requires 
some form of regulation. Four distinct elements are included in the regulatory regime: the 
general framework of laws, constitutional rules, and administrative structures; water resource 
and environmental laws; specific water and sanitation sector regulation; and the individual 
contracts under which the private company operates.12  The concession contract is the main 
source of obligations for the parties. Taking into account the importance of the service rendered, 
the substantial financial means involved, and the lengthy duration of the arrangement, parties 
enter into a complex contractual framework that governs basic matters such as tariffs, 
                                               
8
 International Council of Environmental Law, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United 
Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 4, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/19, of 7 August 2000. 
9
 United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution 15/9: Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation, A/HRC/RES/15/9, of 6 October 2010. 
10
 European Commission, A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final, 
of 20 December 2011 p. 3. 
11
 M. Hennig, Public Service Obligations: Protection of Public Service Values in a National and European Context, 
in E. Szyszczak, J. Davies, M. Andenæs, T. Bekkedal (eds.), “Developments in Services of General Interest”, The 
Hague: Springer, 2011, p. 180. 
12
 J. Rees, Regulation and Private Participation in the Water and Sanitation Sector, in Natural Resources Forum, 
1998, 22(2), pp. 103-104. 
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performance targets, quality standards, penalties, and termination.13 Normally the contract also 
imposes specific public service obligations that include the obligation to supply, equal treatment 
of users, continuity of service, and the like. In exchange, some exclusive rights are usually 
granted to the concessionaire.14 
The provision of water services is also subject to a vast legal framework. Legislators at 
the national or local level enact legal provisions applicable to water services in general and to 
water concessions specifically: laws on the privatisation process, the provision of water services, 
environmental laws, etc. The creation of this legal kaleidoscope is normally accompanied by the 
creation of a regulatory agency to monitor the sector. This body of rules does not merely cover 
the relationship between the state and the private partner – as the service is delivered to the 
public, it is also necessary to regulate the rights of citizens (users/consumers), the third parties to 
the concession contract who enter into water supply contracts with the concessionaire. Taking 
into account the public nature of the service, the regulatory web is composed of provisions that 
impose certain principles such as universality, equality, continuity, impartiality, adaption to the 
needs of users, etc. Citizens are configured as holding certain rights, namely the right of physical 
and economic access to the services, their quality, information about services, complaints about 
services and participation in decisions.15 The traditional bilateral relationship between the state 
and the citizen is replaced with a triangle, where the state is the regulator of the new provider-
consumer relationship.16 
 
2. The Global Water Market and Investor-State Arbitration 
 
The new market-oriented approach paved the way for the emergence of a global 
marketplace for private water services. Companies started marketing their ability to make 
significant capital investments in infrastructures and operate systems in an efficient manner. The 
                                               
13
 P. Spiller, Basic Economic Principles of Infrastructure Liberalization: a Transaction Cost Perspective, in M. 
Finger, R. Künneke (eds.), “International Handbook of Network Industries: The Liberalization of Infrastructure”, 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011 p. 21. 
14
 P. Guislain, M. Kerf, “Concessions – The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector Monopolies”, Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1995 p. 3. 
15
 J. Baptista, “The Regulation of Water and Waste Services: An Integrated Approach”, London: IWA Publishing, 
2014 pp. 27 ff. 
16
 H. Micklitz, Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law, in M. Cremona (ed.), “Market 
Integration and Public Services in the European Union”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 p. 76. 
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combined forces of privatisation and globalisation resulted in a vast number of concession 
contracts being concluded between water companies and foreign states. 
The increase in the flux of foreign investment in water services which took place over the 
last decades would not have been possible without the establishment of a transnational system of 
substantive and procedural guarantees. Currently this system consists of a vast network of 
international investment agreements supplemented by the general rules of international law. 
Investment agreements are a form of international hard law that creates a series of obligations 
owed by the host state towards foreign investors.17 These include the obligation to treat foreign 
investors fairly and equitably; provide foreign investors full protection and security; not to 
expropriate foreign investment except under certain conditions; not to treat covered foreign 
investors less favourably than foreign investors from third countries; and not to treat covered 
foreign investors less favourably than domestic investors. Many investment agreements include 
concessions in their definitions of investment. 18  Even in the absence of express reference, 
concessions can be considered investments to the extent that they require the investor to commit 
capital to a venture with the expectation of receiving a return at a later moment.19 
International investment agreements also include procedural protections. They typically 
contain clauses that grant to the investor the option of either filing claims in the local courts of 
the host state or of initiating an international arbitration.20 The latter is frequently conducted 
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank-
affiliated institution established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID Convention’).21 Water services 
are increasingly implicated in investor-state disputes. According to figures from the ICSID, six 
                                               
17
 See, generally, R. Dolzer, C. Schreuer, “Principles of International Investment Law”, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
18
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Scope and Definition: a Sequel”, UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2011, p. 31. 
19
 J. Salacuse, “The Three Laws of International Investment: National, Contractual, and International Frameworks 
for Foreign Capital”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 p. 17. 
20
 See, generally, C. Dugan, D. Wallace Jr., N. Rubins, B. Sabahi, “Investor-State Arbitration”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
21
 ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc_en-archive/ICSID_English.pdf. 
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percent of all registered ICSID disputes have involved water, sanitation, or flood protection.22 To 
be sure, the ICSID has already administered 13 cases arising from water concession contracts.23 
In such disputes the foreign investor claims that certain acts or omissions of organs of the 
central government or local authorities, which resulted in damages to his investment, violate the 
host state’s obligations under an international investment agreement. The entry of foreign 
investment in the water industry had a significant impact on the relationship between the parties 
and on the adjudication of possible disputes between them. When the management of water 
services is transferred to a domestic company, the contract is regulated by the domestic legal 
system and disputes are normally solved through local courts. Differently, when states delegate 
the management of water services on a foreign company, the foreign investor is protected by 
investment treaties which have been negotiated between the host state and the investor’s national 
government, and the dispute will be settled by an international arbitral tribunal. 
Investor-state disputes arise from a long term relationship between investor and state. 
Salacuse describes this relationship as a ‘complex connection, often amounting to a state of 
interdependence, between the investor and the Host State’.24 The complexity of this relationship 
is patent in a variety of procedural and substantive issues that have been surfacing in arbitration 
proceedings conducted before the ICSID. The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the impact 
of investment arbitration on the protection of public interests associated with water services. 
Despite the social and economic relevance of this phenomenon, it has received little attention 
from scholars. Probably this silence is an eloquent expression of the convoluted character of 
                                               
22
 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2015-2), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202015-
2%20(English).pdf, p. 12. 
23
 Cases concluded: Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3 (‘Vivendi v. Argentina’); Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (‘Azurix v. 
Argentina’); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (‘Suez/Interagua’); Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. Tanzania, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/22 (‘Biwater v. Tanzania’); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17 
(‘Impregilo v. Argentina’). Cases pending: Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (‘Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina’); SAUR International v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4 (‘SAUR International v. Argentina’); Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas 
Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26 (‘Urbaser v. Argentina’); 
United Utilities (Tallinn) B.V. and Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24. Cases 
discontinued: Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (‘Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia’); Aguas 
Cordobesas S.A., Suez, and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/18; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/30; Gelsenwasser AG v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/32. 
24
 J. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, in 
Fordham International Law Journal, 2007, 31, p. 141. 
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these disputes which are governed by a wide array of laws including investment law, 
international law, human rights standards, contractual rights and obligations, and national laws.25 
As there is no international body responsible for water services, the regulation of these services 
is highly fragmented and chaotic. However, the existence of transnational legal frameworks for 
investment protection and dispute settlement produced an important result: it inadvertently 
formed an emerging system of regulatory governance. In deciding these cases arbitrators are 
contributing significantly in shaping the contours and substance of an emerging international 
economic water services regime.26  Through the looking glass of arbitration awards one can 
realise the substantial consequences that the international investment regime has been producing 
on water markets and how significantly it has been impacting the public interests associated with 
water services. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter II examines several criticisms, of 
procedural and substantive nature, that have been levelled against Investor-State Arbitration in 
general. These critiques evidence the ‘growing pains’ of a dispute settlement mechanism that has 
expanded, in both scope and importance, to a level that could not have been predicted when it 
was first implemented. In the specific case of water disputes, several symptoms of these 
‘growing pains’ evidence the profound impact that investment arbitration produced in the water 
industry. The legal principles and frameworks that traditionally supported investor-state 
arbitration did not properly ensure the protection of the public interests associated with water 
services. An analysis of the extant case law allows to diagnose the persistence of some disorders 
that, while of general nature, are particularly expressive in water disputes. Although the system 
has been reforming over the last years in order to cure some of its flaws, the current situation is 
still insactisfactory. Chapter III discusses some remedies that can be prescribed in order to ensure 
due consideration of public interests in water services disputes. It is argued that action is needed 
in two different domains: additional reforms in the investor-state system; and improvements in 
the regulatory framework that governs these disputes (investment treaties and concession 
contracts). It is hoped that these suggestions will contribute to strike a proper balance between 
public and private interests in the water industry. Finally, Chapter IV offers some conclusions. 
                                               
25
 J. Chaisse, M. Polo, Globalization of Water Privatization: Ramifications of Investor-State Disputes in the “Blue 
Gold” Economy, in Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 2015, 38(1), pp. 13-14. 
26
 Ibid, pp. 4, 62. 
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CHAPTER II – PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER CONCESSION 
ARBITRATIONS 
 
3. The ‘Growing Pains’ of Investor-State Arbitration 
 
Investor-state arbitration has been attracting substantial criticism over the last years, with 
several stakeholders voicing concerns about the way in which this dispute settlement mechanism 
is structured and operated. While critiques focus on different issues with varying impact on the 
overall nature and efficiency of the system, together they have led to a sizeable literature on a 
purported ‘crisis’ of the system.27 Signs of dissatisfaction can be seen in the adjustment of the 
substance and procedure of investment treaties in ways that reflect concerns about previous 
trends or, even more clearly, in the withdrawal of some states (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) 
from the ICSID Convention. Taken together, these developments suggest the existence of, at 
least, ‘growing pains’ and call for a re-thinking and re-shaping of the system. Over the next 
pages we examine some of the critiques that have been levelled against the investment arbitration 
regime and discuss how the system has been readjusting in the hope of addressing them. 
 
 3.1 Lack of Transparency 
 
First, investor-state arbitration has been accused of lacking transparency. In the realm of 
investment arbitration ‘transparency’ refers to the extent to which the general public may be 
alerted to the existence of the dispute, have access to key arbitration documents, and attend any 
oral hearings.28 For the most part, the investment arbitration process parallels the commercial 
arbitration mechanism, where disputing parties are masters of the proceedings and generally 
favour confidentiality. The procedural rules are often the same as those applicable to ordinary 
commercial arbitration between private parties. The arbitration rules of the ICSID are the only 
                                               
27
 See, e.g., C. N. Brower, C. H. Brower II, J. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the Global Adjudication System, in 
Arbitration International, 2003, 19(4), pp. 415-440. 
28
 N. Rubins, Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for What Benefit?, in Hofmann, R., Tams, 
C. (eds.), “The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Taking Stock after 40 
Years”, Baden-Banden: Nomos, 2007, p. 214; K. Gómez, Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International 
Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line favorably for the Public Interest, in Fordham International Law 
Journal, 2012, 35, p. 528. 
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set of arbitral rules designed specifically for investor-state arbitration. As a result, confidentiality 
has been a traditional feature of investment arbitration. The topic has assumed considerable 
importance over the last years, with some accusing the system of being secret.29 
Several commentators have criticised the emulation of the confidential model, 
highlighting that investor-state arbitration is fundamentally distinct. Investment disputes often 
raise public interest issues – because their subject matter impacts on the provision of public 
services30 or touches upon sensitive socio-political concerns – which are normally absent from 
commercial arbitration.31 Investors challenge measures adopted by the host-state that the latter 
frequently argues to be in the public interest. The arbitral tribunal performs a supranational 
review of state acts, scrutinising the conduct of public entities against the standards of treatment 
prescribed in international investment agreements. As it functions as an equivalent of judicial 
review of governmental measures, substantial public interests are involved.32 The outcome of 
proceedings may limit the future legislative and administrative freedom of manoeuvre of states, 
affecting their ability to pursue public welfare policies.33 Because the controversy is so deeply 
connected with national policies, the ultimate resolution will have direct effects on the 
population. Such proceedings are public by their very nature and need to be accessible to the 
public. 
Even though investment disputes have the potential to significantly affect public interests, 
they are decided in a process that was originally designed to address private controversies, 
without due regard to the importance of transparency for democratic governance. 34  This 
traditional emphasis on confidentiality increases the arbitrators’ perception that their main 
                                               
29
 See, e.g., A. De Palma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, But Go Too Far 
Critics Say, in New York Times, 11 March 2001, p. 1; New York Times, Editorial: The Secret Trade Courts, in New 
York Times, 27 September 2004; The Economist, Behind Closed Doors; Investment Arbitration and Secrecy, in The 
Economist, 25 April 2009, p. 63. 
30
 L. Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third-Party Participation: UPS v Canada and Methanex Corp. v. United States, in 
T. Weiler (ed.), “International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law”, London: Cameron May, 2005, p. 197. 
31
 R. Buckley, P. Blyschak, Guarding the Open Door: Non-Party Participation Before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, in Banking and Finance Law Review, 2007, 22(3), p. 354. 
32
 N. Blackaby, C. Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?, in Waibel, M., 
Kaushal, A., Chung, K., Balchin, C. (eds.), “The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality”, 
Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010, p. 255. 
33
 C. Knahr, A. Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration – The Biwater 
Gauff Compromise, in Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2006, 6, p. 113; K. Miles, “The 
Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 373-374. 
34
 B. Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest 
Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2008, 41, pp. 782 ff. 
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function is to settle a private dispute between the parties, without duly taking account of larger 
public interests.35 This lack of transparency hampers efforts to track investment treaty disputes, 
monitor their frequency, and evaluate their consequences. The specific characteristics of 
international investment arbitration justify a greater measure of transparency.36 The fact that we 
are dealing with public law disputes requires that the host state’s public has the opportunity to be 
informed about the behavior of governments and arbitral tribunals.37 
Concerns about the lack of transparency of the investment arbitration system cross 
different moments of the proceedings. 
First, there may be lack of transparency regarding the initiation of a dispute. Most 
investment treaties do not require investors to publicly manifest their intention to launch a 
dispute settlement process. In ICSID arbitration all new cases are registered;38 this information is 
also posted on the ICSID website with reference to the name of the parties and the subject matter 
of the dispute.39 Still, this information says little about the contours of the case. This lack of 
publicly accessible information makes it extremely hard to have exact knowledge of the 
existence, number and nature of investor-state disputes, rendering the protection of possible 
public interests involved in such disputes quite difficult.40 
Second, procedural rules typically do not provide for public access to arbitral documents.  
This means that non-parties and the general public have minimal if any access to pleadings and 
evidence.41 Pursuant to rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration rules,42 before or at the first session of 
the tribunal, each arbitrator shall sign a declaration promising to ‘keep confidential all 
information coming to my knowledge as a result of my participation in this proceeding, as well 
as the contents of any award made by the Tribunal’. As regards the minutes and other records of 
                                               
35
 M. Hirsch, Investment Tribunals and Human Rights Treaties: a Sociological Perspective, in F. Baetens (ed.), 
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proceedings and arbitral awards, and pursuant to Regulation 22(2) of the Administrative and 
Financial Regulations, they can only be published with both parties’ consent. 
As for hearings, Rule 32(2) provides: ‘Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after 
consultation with the Secretary-General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their 
agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the 
Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical 
arrangements. The Tribunal shall for such cases establish procedures for the protection of 
proprietary or privileged information.’ As the consent of the parties is required, public access to 
the proceedings remains conditional. This precludes an informed debate on both the quality of 
the process itself and the substantive issues which might touch on matters of public interest.43 
Finally, once the dispute is settled, there may be a lack of public access to the arbitral 
award. The decision on whether to authorise the publication of the final award has traditionally 
remained in the hands of the parties. This means that even those disputes that involve public 
interests may be shrouded in secrecy unless both investor and host state give their consent to 
publication. Public access to arbitral awards is important to allow for public scrutiny of arbitral 
decisions – thus promoting their transparency and legitimacy – but also for the very efficiency of 
the overall investor-state arbitration system. The publication of arbitral decisions allows for the 
formation of a consistent jurisprudence, promoting legal certainty and ensuring predictability, 
which in turn increases the confidence in the system.44 Furthermore, it may contribute to the 
avoidance of unnecessary disputes, as previous awards constitute a point of reference around 
which parties and arbitrators form expectations regarding future decisions.45 
Most arbitration rules contain no explicit legal obligation to make arbitral awards public. 
Pursuant to Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the Centre ‘shall not publish the award 
without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its 
publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.’ The Centre usually obtains the 
consent of the parties for such publication. It then posts the award on the website of ICSID and 
reprints it in the ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal. The ICSID rules and 
regulations do not refer specifically to the actions of the parties. As a result, it is not clear 
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whether they can disclose any documents, including the final award.46 In practice, it is common 
for one of the parties to submit the award for publication in a journal. Many arbitral awards are 
also available online. 47  Sometimes awards circulate within the legal community without 
identifying information. While these ‘sanitised awards’ provide useful substantive information, 
they offer no information about the parties’ identities and the basic contours of the dispute.48 To 
sum up, a lot of information is publicly available, but how much is not available is unknown.49 
 
 3.2 Lack of Public Participation 
 
Another common criticism regards the lack of openness of the investor-state arbitration 
system to public participation.50 Since it is modelled after commercial arbitration, where the only 
relevant interests are those of the parties, investor-state arbitration does not generally allow for 
public access to the arbitral proceedings. Because investor-state arbitration frequently raises 
matters of public concern, interested third parties such as public interest groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) argue that they should have access to the decision-making 
process. The problems dealt with by investment tribunals are often social challenges and quite 
understandably civil society wants to have its say.51 
As a result of the mounting pressure for more public participation in arbitration 
proceedings, ICSID decided in 2006 to amend its Arbitration Rules. The revised text of Rule 
32(2) provides: ‘Unless either party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the Secretary-
General, may allow other persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, 
witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all 
or part of the hearings, subject to appropriate logistical arrangements. The Tribunal shall for such 
cases establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged information.’ 
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As regards the submission of briefs by third parties, a new was introduced making it clear 
that ICSID tribunals may accept and consider written submissions from a non-disputing party. 
Pursuant to Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
 
‘After consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a 
party to the dispute (in this Rule called the “nondisputing party”) to file a written submission 
with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute. In determining whether to 
allow such a filing, the Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which: 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a 
factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or 
insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the scope of the 
dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. 
The Tribunal shall ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the 
proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that both parties are given an 
opportunity to present their observations on the non-disputing party submission.’ 
 
The new rule makes an express reference to the participation of non-parties in the 
proceedings, namely by allowing them to file written submissions. This basically corresponds to 
the figure of amicus curiae. An amicus curiae, literally ‘a friend of the court’, is, according to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘a person who is not a party to a law suit but who petitions courts or is 
requested by the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the 
subject matter.’52 Normally amici curiae are individuals or organisations who are not a party to 
the arbitration but believe that the outcome of the proceedings may affect their interests and 
therefore want to intervene. 
The participation of non-parties in investment arbitration has been justified as a useful 
tool to uphold different public interests. First, it increases the transparency of the system.53 
Second, it promotes greater accountability of investor-state arbitration.54 Third, it increases the 
openness of investment treaty arbitration to civil society, ensuring that the broader community 
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does not perceive it as ‘secretive’.55 This is in line with the changing nature of investment 
arbitration, where tribunals are increasingly required to settle disputes that touch upon public 
interests.56 The participation of civil society in the proceedings is meant to ensure the sensitivity 
of governmental entities towards the possible consequences of the arbitral award. Allowing for 
amicus curiae participation shows the community how concerned investment tribunals are about 
issues societal concerns such as the protection of public health or the environment.57 
Amicus curiae participation has also been justified as a way to help investment tribunals 
to render better awards. For different reasons, parties to the dispute may lack either the necessary 
ability or the appropriate incentives to submit all of the relevant facts, legal arguments, and 
policy implications to the tribunal.58 Amicus may provide the tribunal with its expert scientific or 
technical knowledge, or provide an additional layer of factual information relevant to the dispute. 
Furthermore, amicus briefs can contain legal arguments or perspectives not addressed by the 
parties.59 This might open the door for some creative legal thinking,60 grant third parties a role in 
investment treaty arbitration – and, in a broader sense, in the making of international policy and 
law61 – and possibly even contribute to reduce the perceived fragmentation of international law.62 
Third party involvement serves both to improve the quality of the award and to assist in the 
development of investment law as a whole. 63Third-party involvement is not, by definition, 
limited to written submissions. Frequently amici request permission to consult the disputing 
parties’ documents, respond to questions from the tribunal, attend the hearings, or make oral 
submissions. Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules governs amicus curiae admission but 
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does not regulate access to documents. The grant of amicus curiae status does not automatically 
give the petitioners access to the parties’ submissions. 
Potential amici curiae need to have access to the parties’ submissions and other relevant 
documents. First, because only that will allow them to understand the nature of the dispute and 
the issues raised therein and decide whether they want to intervene. Non-parties are unlikely to 
have a complete picture of the dispute by relying solely on the tiny description available on the 
ICSID website or by reading press reports. Second, only access to the arbitration key documents 
will allow amicus to determine whether they can actually ‘assist the Tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceedings by bringing a perspective, 
particular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties’ as stipulated in 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Without access to relevant documents and proceedings, third 
parties’ ability to formulate effective, meaningful, and informed submissions is seriously limited; 
even worse, they may end up giving opinions based on inaccurate or incomplete information. As 
they do not know whether the parties have already addressed their main concerns, there is also a 
risk of redundancy or overlap. 
Another common request by amici curiae is to be granted access to the hearings. Rule 32 
addresses this issue and stipulates that the tribunal can allow non-parties to attend the hearings 
unless either party objects. As a result, amici are normally not allowed to attend the hearings or 
deliver oral arguments before the tribunal. 
Even after the 2006 amendments, the ICSID Arbitration Rules do not go far enough in 
ensuring adequate levels of transparency and public participation in investor-state disputes. 
Granting third parties the right to file amicus briefs without simultaneously granting them access 
to the arbitration proceedings does not provide them or the wider public with a real view of the 
dispute or answer their pleas for greater transparency and public input.64  The current rules 
significantly contain the potential advantages of amicus curiae intervention. Admitting amici 
without granting them true access to the proceedings is at most a ‘political quick fix’.65 
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 3.3 Disregard for Public Interests 
 
A third criticism, of a substantial nature, regards the lack of balance between the rights of 
investors and non-investment concerns. Over the last decades investor-state arbitration stretched 
not only in number of cases but also in the range of issues that trigger those disputes. Arbitrators 
have been called to address a multiplicity of regulatory issues, from the provision of basic public 
services to the protection of human rights.66 No longer limited to the technical intricacies of 
investment law, contemporary arbitrations frequently implicate general issues regarding the 
scope of the regulatory powers of the respondent states. The growing complexity of the legal 
issues faced by investment tribunals calls for an examination of the relationship between the 
private rights of investors and non-investment concerns.67 
According to some commentators, investors have been able to contest legislative and 
administrative measures that would normally fall within the scope of sovereign states because 
arbitrators have construed the standards of treatment contained in international investment 
agreements in an overly expansive manner.68 Arbitrators use imprecise provisions on investor 
protection to meddle in the regulatory space of host states, reviewing public policy decisions and 
thus limiting the jurisdiction of domestic courts and regulators. This results in a shrinking of 
domestic policy space and interferes with the state’s ability to determine its own obligations 
under national law. 69  Some authors talk about a potential ‘regulatory chill’, as the strict 
application of investment law by arbitrators may have a chilling effect on host states’ regulatory 
initiatives that are needed to address non-investment policy goals.70 The notion of regulatory 
chill suggests that the investment arbitration system may impact the normal course of policy 
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development and implementation. In some circumstances governments may fail to modify, enact 
or enforce new regulatory measures because they are afraid of facing arbitration proceedings.71 
Some commentators go farther and contend that the current system does not strike a 
proper balance between the interests of investors and other important social goals, or is even 
biased in favour of the former.72 From this perspective, investment arbitration has been biased in 
favour of foreign investors to the detriment of the sovereign power and duty of host states to 
pursue the general interest for their populations. This lack of balance results, inter alia, from an 
alleged predisposition of arbitrators towards the primacy of commercial interests.73 According to 
this perspective, arbitrators tend to overlook the broader public interests involved in investment 
disputes, including host states’ international law obligations outside investment treaties. 
A related critique is the so-called ‘fragmentation’ of international law. Some argue that 
arbitrators apply the provisions of investment agreements in isolation and show some aversion to 
applying non-investment rules to the dispute, even when they are arguably pertinent.74 This 
alleged fragmentation has resulted in awards in which investment obligations were ranked above 
obligations of diverse nature or applied as a sort of ‘self-contained regime’. This significantly 
constrains states’ ability to implement policy goals to which they may be committed. 
 
4. Symptoms of the Growing Pains in Water Disputes 
 
On the preceding pages we discussed three central flaws that have been identified in the 
investor-state arbitration system. They all reveal how difficult it is to reconcile the promotion 
and protection of private interests (those of investors) with the safeguard of collective interests 
associated with public services. These disorders are eloquently evidencied by particular 
symptomps in cases concerning water concessions. The extant case law reveals the substantial 
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consequences that the international investment regime has been producing on water markets and 
how significantly it has been impacting the public interests associated with water provision. 
 
 4.1 Muddy Waters? 
 
Investor-state arbitration has been accused of not being transparent. Transparency is 
essential for the legitimacy of any dispute settlement mechanism but also, more broadly, in the 
provision of any service that satisfies public needs. The tenet of transparency entails the 
availability of information on water management projects. An example of the importance of 
transparency in the provision of water services can be found on General Comment no. 15 on The 
Right to Water, 75 issued in 2002 by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and which has been invoqued by some authors to advocate the existence of a 
‘human right to water. 76  According to General Comment no. 15, 77  this right contains a 
requirement of informational accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive and 
impart information concerning water issues. Individuals should be given full and equal access to 
information concerning water, water services and the environment, held by public authorities or 
third parties. 
Commentators have argued that Public-Private Partnerships provide only limited 
opportunities for meaningful levels of transparency 78  and that concessions are particularly 
opaque due to their long-term, often-complex financial structures.79  Sometimes governments 
authorise large infrastructure projects and water concession contracts without consultation with 
local communities. As a result, private participation in water management may reduce 
transparency and accountability.80 The introduction of private partners moves governance from 
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transparent public documentation to private, confidential contracts not accessible to the general 
public. 
Individuals and public interest organisations have been demanding more transparency 
regarding private participation in water systems.81  When a dispute over a water concession 
contract is brought before an investment tribunal, the existence of public interests is evident, as 
the outcome of the dispute may have an impact upon on the provision and costs of a vital public 
service. Some argue that the investor-state mechanism favours concessionaires because they can 
carefully restrict the amount of information released to the public. This is relevant not only for 
the specific dispute but also because it can help water companies in future dealings with other 
states, where they can hide troublesome past cases.82 
The first case to raise public concern about transparency of the proceedings in water 
disputes was Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia. Several NGOs and individuals submitted a petition to 
the tribunal requesting that it made public all documents, proceedings and hearings, and any 
decisions of the tribunal generated during the process. At the time this matter was regulated by 
ICSID Arbitration Rule 32 (2), which required parties’ consent for third parties to attend the 
hearings. The tribunal rejected the requests arguing that they were beyond its powers, that the 
parties’ consent was not present, and that there was no need to call witnesses or seek 
supplementary non-party submissions.83 
The second case raising transparency concerns was Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina. Five 
NGOs filed a petition asking the tribunal to grant access to the hearings in the case, access to 
documents, and permission to present legal arguments as amicus curiae. The tribunal denied 
petitioners’ request to attend the hearings based on the claimants’ refusal. The decision on the 
request for access to documents was deferred until the grant of a leave to file an amicus curiae 
brief.84 
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The third case was Suez/Interagua v. Argentina. Several interested parties submitted a 
petition asking the tribunal to allow the presentation of oral arguments at the hearings, access to 
documents, and to submit amicus curiae briefs. The tribunal was exactly the same as in 
Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina and held that the issues raised in the petition were virtually identical 
to those raised in the petition filed in that case, denying the petitioners’ request to attend the 
hearings on the same grounds. 85 Additionally, the tribunal decided to grant an opportunity to the 
petitioners to apply for leave to make amicus curiae submission. Finally, the tribunal denied the 
petitioners’ request for access documents, but specified that it would consider whether access to 
documents can be granted as a matter of principle and reconsider the petitioners’ qualification if 
and when the petitioners provide the tribunal with convincing information and reasons that they 
qualify as amicus curiae. 
A final case raising concerns about transparency of the proceedings was Biwater v. 
Tanzania. The investor filed a request for provisional measures on confidentiality, complaining 
that the respondent state had unilaterally disclosed documents without an agreement of both 
parties to this effect. The tribunal issued a procedural order86 acknowledging that it had to strike 
a balance between transparency and the procedural integrity of the arbitration. While parties were 
free to conclude any agreements they choose concerning confidentiality, such an agreement had 
not been reached. Similarly, the applicable investment treaty did not contain any provision on 
confidentiality. Furthermore, there was no provision imposing a general duty of confidentiality in 
ICSID arbitrations or imposing a general rule of transparency. While the 2006 amendments to 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules reflected the trend in investment arbitration towards transparency, 
they were silent on the issue of disclosure of documents by the disputing parties. 
The procedural order differentiates between documents submitted during the proceedings 
and the final award, reaching to different conclusions as to the permissibility of their publication 
and distribution. The tribunal took a ‘police patrol’ rather than a ‘fire alarm’ approach, arguing 
that its function was not to merely react after harm had already been done to one of the parties.87 
The tribunal considered that there was a risk of aggravation of the dispute as a result of previous 
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inflamed discussion of the case in the media. On the other hand, taking into account the public 
interests associated with the dispute, any restrictions should be carefully and narrowly delimited. 
In the end, the tribunal reached a rather nuanced conclusion distinguishing between different 
aspects of transparency and confidentiality and different types of documents.88 
 
 4.2 Myopic Amici? 
 
The second criticism regards the lack of openness of investor-state arbitration to public 
participation. Traditionally third parties are not allowed to participate in the proceedings. This is 
especially problematic in disputes over services that satisfy public interests such as water 
provision.The governance of water services is interwoven with the exercise of citizenship rights. 
This entails the right to participate in the decisions about how water services are managed. One 
of the ‘Dublin Principles’ is that water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels. This means that 
decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with full public consultation and involvement 
of users in the planning and implementation of water projects.89 According to General Comment 
no. 15 on the Right to Water, the right of individuals and groups to participate in decision-
making processes that may affect their exercise of the right to water must be an integral part of 
any policy, programme or strategy concerning water. 90  Participatory governance can make 
decision-making more effective, lead to greater political acceptability of decisions and foster 
accountability. 
Public-Private Partnerships are frequently presented as less representative and 
participatory than public management.91 Further, authors have argued that public participation is 
undermined in concession contracts due to their long-term, complex financial structures.92 As a 
result, private participation in water management may reduce public participation and 
accountability. 93  Individuals and public interest organisations have been demanding greater 
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consultation and public scrutiny over private participation in water systems.94 Calls for greater 
input from civil society extend to arbitration proceedings. To address public interest concerns, 
individuals and public interest groups have been resorting to the institution of amicus curiae. 
Thus far amicus curiae participation has been granted in several ICSID proceedings, almost all of 
them related to water concessions. This is no coincidence as water provision is a public service 
and private involvement sparks heated discussion. Tribunals faced with water disputes never fail 
to mention the ‘public nature’ of these cases. 
In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia the petitioners also introduced an application to participate 
as parties – or, alternatively, to be granted amicus curiae status – invoking the public character of 
the dispute. The tribunal rejected the request based on the three arguments mentioned previously. 
The tribunal’s decision, besides raising criticism about the secrecy of ICSID proceedings, 
reinforced the idea that such arbitrations involved nothing beyond the parties. One NGO 
lambasted the decision as ‘profoundly undemocratic’, ‘inexcusable’, a ‘closed-door process’ and 
an ‘extreme example of excessive power granted to corporations’.95 
The second time non-parties requested permission to take part in the proceedings as 
amicus curiae was in the Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina case. In contrast with the decision in Aguas 
del Tunari, the tribunal held that it had the power under article 44 of the ICSID Convention, 
which grants the arbitral tribunal the power to decide on procedural questions that are not 
regulated by the rules of the ICSID Convention, to grant amicus curiae status. The tribunal 
decided that the exercise of the power to accept amicus submissions should depend on three 
criteria: the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; the suitability of a given nonparty 
to act as amicus curiae, and the procedure by which the amicus submission is made and 
considered. The petitioners had also requested access arbitral documents but claimants opposed 
the request. The tribunal recalled that the revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules did not deal 
with amicus’s access to the record and thus provided no guidance. It considered that the 
petitioners had sufficient information even without being granted access to the arbitration 
record.96 
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The third case was Suez/Interagua v. Argentina. The tribunal was exactly the same as in 
Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina and the decision closely similar. While petitioners were granted an 
opportunity to apply for amicus curiae status; their request to attend the hearings was denied due 
to lack of consent by both parties. The request for access documents was rejected, being 
specified that the tribunal would consider whether access to documents could be granted and 
reconsider the petitioners’ qualification if and when the petitioners provided convincing 
information and reasons that they qualified as amicus curiae.97 
Finally, in Biwater v. Tanzania, five NGOs applied for amicus status. This was the first 
case where the new Rule 37(2) was applied. The petitioners requested access to arbitral 
documents and oral hearings. The tribunal denied access to the parties’ written pleadings, 
observing that it did not feel the information was necessary for the petitioners to make their 
submissions on the ground that the dispute was a ‘very public and widely reported dispute’ and 
that the information that led to the amici’s ‘application to intervene’ was sufficient to make 
further submissions. Access to hearings was also refused in the absence of both parties’ consent. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal reserved the right to ask the NGOs specific questions in relation to 
their written submission.98 
The petitioners had to file a written submission without having seen the pleadings or 
other documents. In taking this position, the tribunal impaired the ability of petitioners to provide 
their ‘perspectives, arguments and expertise that will help it to arrive at a correct decision.’ The 
potential relevance of the submission was irremediably affected because the petitioners had no 
access to the allegations made by the claimant, the legal framing of its claim, and the 
respondent’s defence.99  Unsurprisingly, the amici submitted a brief that was based on self-
admittedly speculative arguments.100 The tribunal later justified its divergence on one of the 
petitioner’s assertions by noting that the petitioners did not have all the relevant information.101  
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Because they were denied access to the key arbitral documents and hearings, amicus 
curiae were not totally blindfolded, but at least myopic. They were not totally ignorant of the 
circumstances of the case – because it was a ‘very public and widely reported dispute’ – but did 
not perceive it with a clear vision. Their comprehension of the facts and issues raised was 
blurred. Because they were not given the chance to read the claim and reply, the concession 
contract, go through the parties submissions, and attend the hearings, they were seriously 
prevented from exercising their function. 
Tribunals should have the power to decide whether to grant access to some or all of the 
documents on the record. Without prior access to party submissions, amici will have, at most, a 
merely speculative sense of the factual and legal arguments that the parties have made or intend 
to make, and will probably tend to offer tribunals arguments largely redundant to, or even 
irrelevant to, those contained in party submissions.102 A distinction needs to be drawn between 
transparency and public participation. One thing is to have access to information on the dispute; 
another is to be able to take part in the arbitration, not passively but actively, having a chance to 
influence the course of proceedings. If amici are not given a proper chance to get acquainted 
with the statements of claim and defence, analyse the concession contract and other essential 
documents, and attend the hearings, they are seriously prevented from exercising their role. 
Without effective knowledge of the essential elements of the dispute, amici are precluded from 
making informed submissions and instil public concerns into the decision-making process. The 
openness of proceedings to civil society – namely through the participation of amici curiae – 
requires a higher measure of transparency. Indeed, openness implies a form of active 
transparency – amici need to be able not only to ‘see’ what is going on but also to actively 
participate in the proceedings. Naturally, the issues of transparency and third party participation 
are intimately linked. Transparency allows for more informed public participation; just like third 
party participation increases the transparency of the process. 
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 4.3 Public Interests Down the Drain? 
 
Finally, investment arbitration has been accused of not balancing the rights of investors 
and non-investment concerns. Because water services are associated with public interests, water-
related disputes provide an eloquent example of this clash between private and public interests.  
The flux of foreign investment into the water industry led to the internationalisation of 
disputes and of their method of settlement. When disputes over the performance of a water 
concession give origin to investment claims, public authorities are put in a challenging position. 
The state need to combine two different roles – its role in the provision of services of public 
interest and the fulfilment of its international legal obligations arising from international 
investment agreements. The combination of these two dimensions results in the creation of an 
entirely ‘new creature’ – disputes initiated by foreign investors against states alleging violations 
of their rights under investment treaties for regulatory measures which states argue were taken to 
protect essential public interests.103 
One of the reasons why investor-state arbitration is surrounded by controversy is the fact 
that it is based on investment treaties, perceived by many as legal instruments that constrain the 
ability of governments to regulate the activity of companies inside their territory. This risk is 
especially acute when investors are in charge of the provision of services of public interest. Some 
claim that investment agreements are framed within a liberal model that prioritises the protection 
of investor’s rights over the protection of public interests. From this viewpoint, investment 
treaties are a form of international regulation that focuses primarily on the protection of 
investors’ interests.104 They put forward a series of international obligations that may collide 
with measures adopted by national authorities. Albeit the state has delegated the operation of 
water systems, it is still responsible for the regulation of private operators. The protection of the 
public interests associated with these services is in flux, as it follows the ever-changing needs of 
society. As a result, the regulatory framework agreed upon between state and investor may 
undergo significant changes so as to adjust to unexpected events or adapt to new challenges. The 
problem is that international investment agreements petrify the normative environment 
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contemporary to their conclusion, embedding the expectations that the host state and the investor 
had in that moment. As a result, international investment agreements place a heavy burden on 
public authorities if they wish to adopt measures not envisioned by the investor or do so in a 
surprising manner.105 Water companies feel comfortable with this scenario where standards of 
behaviour are set nationally (both contractually and legally) but disputes are solved in the 
international arena, based on international investment agreements that protect them from 
domestic policies they find harmful to their interests. Consequently, the threat of recourse to 
international arbitration cast a shadow over national policymaking. 106  Furthermore, because 
domestic policy choices are reviewed by international tribunals, investment agreements can lock 
countries into an irreversible process of privatisation of the water sector.107 
In a typical investment dispute the investor claims compensation for damages it has 
allegedly suffered as a result of measures adopted by the host state. Most of the disputes to date 
involved allegations of indirect or ‘regulatory expropriation’, or allegations that regulatory 
measures taken by the state constitute ‘unfair or inequitable treatment’. In the context of water 
concessions, an investor may challenge decisions such as the modification of the amount or 
duration of the investment, applicable operational requirements such as quality standards, or the 
tariffs that the investor is allowed to charge.108 Issues of price and quality control are often at the 
heart of the dispute. These are, however, central topics in the regulation of public services as 
they determine the conditions of access of citizens to the services.109 The potential for conflict is 
self-evident. 
Investment law, and the arbitral decisions applying it, has been biased in favour of 
investors to the detriment of the sovereign power of host states to pursue the general interest for 
their populations. This lack of balance results, inter alia, from an alleged predisposition of 
arbitrators towards the primacy of commercial interests. Concerns about the independence and 
impartiality of arbitrators are augmented in water disputes before the ICSID, with some arguing 
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that water companies see this institution – affiliated with the World Bank – as an ideal forum 
because the World Bank has been supporting privatisation of water services for decades.110 Some 
argue that the cases of Bolivia and Argentina demonstrate the persistent influence of the ICSID 
on water sector reforms and policies. From this angle, the institutions that promoted privatisation 
are sustained through institutional frameworks such as the rules of the ICSID.111 
An analysis of the decisions rendered by ICSID tribunals shows that arbitral panels have 
largely failed to understand the importance of the lawful exercise of state’s regulatory powers in 
the area of essential public services as they tend to consider alleged breaches of treaty 
obligations in isolation from a wide range of issues that are necessarily associated with the 
concession contract. These decisions seem oblivious to the specific characteristics of water 
concessions, namely the context of the privatisation process and the mechanisms through which 
public service regulations and contracts are put in place. Tribunals have not adequately weighted 
the interests of parties other than the disputing parties, nor the special duties and obligations a 
state has in a public-private partnership. This suggests that arbitrators do not have the capacity or 
expertise to identify the intricate crossing of domestic private/public law and international 
public/private law that takes place in disputes over water concession contracts.112 
 
 4.3.1 The Human Right to Water: Just an Aspirational Buzzword? 
 
The investment arbitration system has been accused of not striking a proper balance 
between the goal of investment protection and other important social concerns. According to this 
line of thinking, arbitrators tend to overlook the broader public interests involved in investment 
disputes and host states’ obligations outside investment treaties. In the case of water disputes this 
aversion to apply non-investment rules, when they would arguably be applicable, has been 
insistently criticised by authors who advocate that water is a human right. The campaign for the 
recognition of a ‘human right to water’ emerged as a response to the privatisation trend. This 
movement argues that water is a fundamental human right and therefore should not be subject to 
                                               
110
 M. Goldman, How ‘‘Water for All!’’ Policy Became Hegemonic: The Power of the World Bank and its 
Transnational Policy Networks, in Geoforum, 2007, 38, p. 797. 
111
 M. Laffey, J. Weldes, Policing and Global Governance, in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.), “Power in Global 
Governance”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 73. 
112
 D. Allen, “This Business Will Never Hold Water:” International Investment Arbitration on Public-Private Water 
Service Provision – A Comment on Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, 2010, p. 29, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540256. 
31 
 
private management, calling for the affirmation of this human right in national legislation and the 
prohibition of privatisation of water services. The use of the rhetoric of human rights in water 
concession arbitrations replicates some of these arguments, turning investment arbitration into a 
floor for heated discussions not only about the alleged violation of an investment treaty but also 
the potential breach of a human right. The defective performance of a particular concessionaire 
may be presented as a symbol of the failure of the Public-Private Partnership model and call for a 
return to publicly-managed systems. This puts an increased spotlight on the dispute. 
A human right to water is not expressly recognised in generally applicable and binding 
international agreements, leading to uncertainty over the existence of this right. Even though the 
right to water is not explicitly mentioned in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, in 2002 the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which oversees implementation of the Covenant, issued a General Comment (No 15) 
clearly stating the existence of a right to water under Article 11 (the right to an adequate standard 
of living) and Article 12 (the right to the highest attainable standard of health). The right to water 
is inferred from both of these articulated rights. According to the Committee, Article 11(1) 
‘specifies a number of rights emanating from, and indispensable for, the realization of the right 
to an adequate standard of living “including adequate food, clothing and housing”. The use of the 
word “including” indicates that this catalogue of rights was not intended to be exhaustive. The 
right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate 
standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival.’113 
General Comment No. 15 lays down the normative content of the right encompassing 
both procedural and substantive components. The substantive dimensions comprise availability, 
quality, and accessibility, including the principle that ‘water, and water facilities and services, 
must be affordable for all.’114 The procedural components consist of the right to information 
concerning water issues, the right to participate, and the right to effective remedies.115  The 
existence of a human right to water imposes a ‘constant and continuing duty’ on states to ‘move 
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of the right to water’,116 
namely through the fulfilment of three types of obligations: obligations to respect, obligations to 
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protect and obligations to fulfil.117  The Committee underlines that where water services are 
operated or controlled by third parties, state parties must prevent them from compromising equal, 
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water.118 
Despite the assertion of a human right to water in General Comment No. 15, the fact is 
that it is not a binding agreement ratified by states. In 2010, the United Nations General 
Assembly went further and adopted a resolution recognising an international human right to 
water,119 followed by a resolution adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council on the 
human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation.120 The United Nations Assembly 
resolution declared the right to safe and clean drinking water as a human right that is essential for 
the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. However, forty-one counties abstained from 
signing the resolution when it was first introduced.121 As a result, and for now, the claim to a 
human right to water rests on shaky legal ground. 122  There is currently no internationally 
recognised ‘right to water’, in the sense of a legally binding norm.123 Some authors talk about the 
human right to water as an emerging, aspirational, or implicit right.124 Others argue that the 
human right to water is evolving into becoming a part of customary international law.125 
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A right to water is instrumental in making water a legal entitlement, rather than a 
commodity, thereby giving each citizen a range of legal tools to secure their rights.126 However, 
the affirmation of such a right is not in itself incompatible with private operation of water 
services.127 While governments under General Comment No. 15 are required to provide access to 
affordable, safe water without discrimination, the question of private or public control is not 
discussed. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ definition 
of the right to water is too broad to simply rule out the possibility of privatisation. 128 
Furthermore, General Comment No. 15 itself makes several references to the role of the private 
sector in water services.129 The human right to water has an aspirational dimension, as it raises 
expectations and places responsibility for such expectations on both public and private actors. 
The focus is not on the advantages of public versus private management but rather on to the 
responsibilities and accountability of all actors involved in water provision.130 States are required 
to fulfil their responsibilities whether they deliver the service directly or not. This helps to clarify 
the minimum obligations of governments and private companies and provides a legal framework 
for action. 
The intersection between the obligations that result from the essential nature of water 
services and from international investment treaties puts public authorities in a challenging 
position. The state is subject to positive obligations and must take adequate measures to respect, 
protect, and fulfil human rights within its territory. As a result, public entities may want to 
intervene to protect certain fundamental interests of their population. However, by taking 
measures in furtherance of its human rights obligations, host states might breach investment 
rules. This seems to create a clash between the obligation to protect the foreign investments of 
water companies against the obligation to adopt regulatory measures needed to protect the 
human right to water. Even thought the state has the right – and also the obligation – to regulate 
essential services such as water, the existence of obligations arising from international 
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investment agreements may reduce their regulatory autonomy and affect the human right to 
water on the ground.131 
Investment arbitration has been accused of focusing on the law and logic of international 
investment law without taking into account non-investment rules arguably applicable to disputes. 
This apparent ‘fragmentation’ has especially been noted with regard to the connection between 
investment law and human rights, calling for an assessment of the interaction between these two 
dimensions of international law. 132  The existence of a fundamental inconsistency between 
investment obligations and human rights obligations has been invoked by host states as a defence 
to justify a breach of their obligations under international investment agreements. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights encouraged states to raise their human rights 
obligations in investment arbitrations ‘where a decision of a tribunal might affect the enjoyment 
of human rights nationally or where the interpretation of a provision in an investment agreement 
might have a human rights dimension”.133 Some argue that in doing so states show their good 
faith effort to respect different international obligations simultaneously.134 Still, in a number of 
investment proceedings host states did not make use of human rights arguments. This might be 
due to fear of acknowledging obligations for themselves in other settings135 or because human 
rights violations by the investor may sometimes occur in complicity with the host state.136 Non-
parties have also been using their amicus curiae status to bring human rights considerations to 
the attention of the tribunal. This is especially important because, for different reasons, states and 
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investors may not do so, even when the case might have an important human rights 
component.137 Amici may voice the concerns of the affected citizens by advocating in favour of a 
certain interpretation of investment rules or by relying on the host state’s human rights 
obligations in order to defend its measures. 
While human rights arguments in investment arbitration are a relatively recent 
phenomenon, in cases involving water concessions tribunals have been forced to mention the 
right to water, if not to take it into consideration. Both Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia and Vivendi 
v. Argentina concerned situations where water prices had risen dramatically. Tribunals, however, 
did not directly address human rights concerns.138 In Azurix v. Argentina the host state claimed 
that there was a conflict between the investment treaty and the protection of consumers’ rights, 
arguing that such a conflict should be resolved in favour of human rights because consumers’ 
public interests should prevail over the private interest of service providers. The tribunal avoided 
the conflict by noting that ‘the matter has not been fully argued and the Tribunal fails to 
understand the incompatibility in the specifics of the instant case’.139 This indicates that, though 
open to consider the problem, the tribunal saw the alleged conflict as irrelevant.140 
In both Suez/Interagua and Suez/Vivendi the respondent state (Argentina) asserted that it 
adopted some measures in order to protect citizens’ human right to water, and that even if certain 
of its actions might have breached investment provisions, it should be absolved of liability by 
virtue of the defence of necessity under customary international law. Both awards, rendered by 
the same panel, addressed the relevance of human rights obligations as regards the interpretation 
of the concept of fair and equitable treatment. According to the tribunals, in interpreting this 
standard it was necessary to bear in mind that the concession contract was subject to the 
regulatory authority of the Argentine state, which had ‘a reasonable right to regulate’. Thus, the 
tribunal had to balance the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the investor with 
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Argentina’s right to ‘regulate the provision of a vital public service’.141 The panels found that 
Argentina’s refusal to revise the tariff in accordance with the concession contract and the 
regulatory framework violated its commitments under the investment treaty to treat the 
claimants’ investments fairly and equitably. Both tribunals also discussed the defence of 
necessity in length. While acknowledging that the provision of water services was vital to well-
being of the population and therefore an essential interest of the Argentine state, tribunals were 
not convinced that the only way that Argentina could satisfy that essential interest was by 
adopting measures that would subsequently violate the treaty rights of the investors. Finally, 
arbitrators analysed whether the termination of the concession contract by the grantor constituted 
a breach of the investment treaty. They held that Argentina’s termination of the concession was 
done pursuant to the concession contract, finding that the record was insufficient to establish that 
Argentina had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Even though Argentina made use of human rights arguments in both cases (amplified by 
amicus briefs in Suez/Vivendi) the fact is that arbitral panels did not comment on the relevance 
of human rights provisions in the interpretation of the relevant treaties nor did them make any 
reference to them in the awards. This is in contradiction with the considerations made by the 
tribunals when replying to requests for amicus participation, where they held that these disputes 
‘raised a variety of complex public and international law questions, including human rights 
considerations’.142 Apparently arbitrators were only concerned with dismissing the claim that 
human rights law should take precedence over investment law, failing to consider the role and 
potential impact of human rights obligations in those disputes.143 
In Biwater v. Tanzania the tribunal recognised the relevance of human rights 
considerations in its Procedural Order No. 5,144 which granted the amici the right to make a 
submission. However, like in previous cases, the discussion on the role of human rights in the 
application and interpretation of the investment treaty appears to be absent from the final award. 
Negligible attention was paid to the human rights or public interest angles of the case, despite 
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their acknowledged relevance. While the award summarises the amici’s arguments, it shows little 
evidence of their influence. According to one author, this decision reflects the one-dimensional 
weighting of duties and responsibilities that characterises investment treaties.145 
In Impregilo v. Argentina the host state also tried to articulate a defence based on the 
protection of human rights, but in a quite timid fashion. Argentina claimed that the regulatory 
actions taken by public authorities were lawful and proportionate, and that the regulatory powers 
of the state were ‘particularly important in order to guarantee its inhabitants the human right to 
water.’146 Again, Argentina claimed that the investment obligations assumed by the country did 
not prevail over the obligations assumed in treaties on human rights. Therefore, the obligations 
arising from the investment treaty must not be construed separately but in accordance with the 
rules on protection of human rights. Argentina did not elaborate further on the purported human 
right to water, and the award is totally silent on the matter. 
In SAUR International v. Argentina, once again the respondent state tried to argue that 
the applicable international investment treaty regime did not modify its international human 
rights obligations. It urged the tribunal to interpret its international investment treaty obligations 
in harmony with norms of international human rights protection and in particular, those related to 
the right to water. 147 The tribunal agreed that human rights provisions in general, and the right to 
water specifically, were a source of law that it needed to take into consideration in reaching its 
decision. It specified, however, that those rights were compatible with the right of the investor to 
be protected under the applicable investment treaty stating that the two bodies of law operated on 
different levels. The tribunal concluded that it had to balance the two principles, and ultimately 
found that Argentina had violated its investment obligations.148 The award only refers to human 
rights provisions when summarising the arguments presented by the host state, otherwise the 
decision is silent about human rights considerations. 
Human rights considerations are slowly making their way into investment disputes. 
However, there is still a considerable gap between the logic, principles, and legal frameworks 
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pertaining to such diverse considerations – investment protection and human rights promotion. 
Therefore, the precise relationship between international human rights law and international 
investment law remains unclear. Arbitrators faced with human rights arguments have dismissed 
them on procedural grounds instead of dealing with the substantive issues they raise.149 So far 
arbitrators have either escaped from developing a comprehensive balanced approach to human 
rights issues150 or addressed these questions in a sporadic manner.151 One of the reasons for this 
is probably the insufficient clarity about the status of the right to water.152 
Amici curiae have not been more successful in their endeavour to draw the tribunal’s 
attention to human rights considerations. The impact of amicus participation in the outcome of 
the dispute is hard to assess since tribunals at most summarise their arguments but do not address 
them specifically. As a result, human rights considerations introduced by amici have had a 
limited success, facing the same reluctance by investment tribunals to engage in human rights 
discussions.153 Arbitral tribunals seem to be more concerned with tackling the accusations of 
reduced transparency and legitimacy of the arbitration system than with taking into account 
human rights concerns.154 Still, amicus curiae participation is a useful tool that may add a human 
rights dimension to investment arbitration.155 
The cases discussed above illustrate how complex it is for tribunals to balance the 
reasonable expectations of investors with the right to regulate the provision of public services. 
The relationship between international investment law and the regulation of public services is a 
tense one, and can become an increasingly relevant issue in investor-state arbitration. Private 
participation in water provision created a new dimension to how positive and negative duties 
with respect to the human right to water were traditionally perceived.156 International investment 
agreements accord investors special substantive and procedural protections that also benefit 
those companies investing in foreign water markets. The source of the tension between 
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international investment law and human rights, namely a purported human right to water, is that 
international law did not adjust to these developments appropriately. Investment law does not 
impose binding obligations on companies which could assist states in the fulfilment of their 
human rights duties. This precludes any meaningful consideration of investors’ human rights 
obligations. 
 
 4.3.2 Erosion of the Concept of Public Services 
 
The clash between investment law and public interests in water concession disputes has, 
thus far, been essentially framed using the language of human rights, namely, the human right to 
water. The human rights narrative is used to illustrate the tension between investment protection 
and non-investment concerns. This perspective has merited substantial academic attention but 
produced little, if any, impact on the decisions of arbitral tribunals. While societal interests 
associated with water services have been repeatedly associated with the language of human 
rights, the traditional qualification of water services as ‘public services’ or ‘services of public 
interest’ has been incomprehensibly overlooked. Several actors have called for the need to assess 
the interaction between human rights and investment law when discussing water disputes. 
However, another assessment needs to be made: one that focuses on the possible conflict 
between investor rights and its public service obligations. This exercise identifies several 
common points between the language of human rights and the narrative of public service 
obligations. What is more, it helps to clarify the unique nature of water services, which are 
regulated in different dimensions, both at the national (public service obligations) and 
international level (human rights obligations). One wonders whether public interests would have 
been addressed differently by investment tribunals if states and amicus curiae had based their 
arguments in the legal and contractual provisions that impose public service obligations on water 
service providers instead of resorting to the language of human rights. 
The concept of ‘public service’ has always been ambiguous, and its political definition 
quite elusive. It is neither a term of international law nor of any particular national legal system. 
Public-private partnerships promoted the dissociation between services provided by the state and 
services that relate to public interests, frequently without the creation of a clear legal framework 
to govern them. This poses a challenge to the publicness of public services due to the 
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reorientation of state policies and administrative reforms towards the principles of market and 
business management.157 The globalisation process further affected the definition and contents of 
what used to be considered a ‘public service’. The concept has been eroded, both in its political 
and legal dimensions. It has not been upgraded to a transnational dimension and adjusted to the 
new landscape of open markets. Public international law has paid little attention to privatisation, 
in clear contrast to the consideration it has given to privatisation’s antithesis, nationalisation.158 
Despite its evident connection to water disputes, the concept of ‘public service’ seems to 
be lost in the combat between investors and host states or, at least, when it makes a short 
appearance, it is disguised – wrapped in ‘human rights’ or ‘public interests’ considerations. This 
erodes the concept by omitting the reference to its most importance consequence – the existence 
of ‘public service obligations’. Probably this is one of the reasons why non-investment 
considerations have been framed in the ‘language’ of human rights – the absence of a visible 
international discourse on public services. Still, the importance of access to water has been 
acknowledged within the two different normative and analytical frameworks. Both the human 
rights and the public services approach serve as regulatory safeguards.159 However, while human 
rights have an international dimension, public services are contained in the domestic sphere. 
Whereas the human rights concept refers mainly to human rights law as part of international law, 
essential services are to be situated in an economic law analysis, more common to be found in 
the context of the World Trade Organisation and the European Union.160 
The concept of public service has been absent from investor-state arbitrations because it 
has a national nature that does not fit well with the ‘international’ and ‘treaty-based’ nature of 
such disputes. This notion that has its roots in national legal systems. Even in Europe, a 
remarkable example of legislative integration and harmonisation, the regulation of this issue is 
left to member-states. Investor-state disputes generally apply international law, and even when 
references are made to national laws, they do not go so far as to include a serious analysis of 
what ‘public service’ means or what ‘public services obligations’ it entails. Investment treaty 
arbitration is a dispute settlement method aimed primarily at establishing whether the host state 
has violated its international obligations under an international investment agreement. As a 
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consequence, the applicable law essentially consists of public international law. This is not to say 
that municipal law has no role to play, but its application to the dispute as such is limited 
compared with public international law. As a result of the international nature of the proceedings, 
there is a pre-eminent influence of public international law.161 
National law – where the regulation of the provision of essential services like water is to 
be found – does not necessarily have to be excluded from investor-state proceedings. Pursuant to 
the first part of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention, the tribunal shall decide a dispute in 
accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Some investment treaties 
contain an express choice of law clause. In this case, the origin of the choice of law rule is self-
evident: the treaty itself. Furthermore, in disputes concerning water services the investor and the 
host state entered into a direct contractual relation – the concession contract – which may contain 
a choice of law provision. If any of these choice of law clauses refer to national law, then 
national legislation, including rules on public services, is evidently applicable. The reference to 
the law of the host state is likely to occur in concession contracts. If the parties so agree, national 
law will be applicable to the rights and obligations of the parties. The applicable law clauses of 
many investment treaties also refer to national law. In such cases both systems of law – national 
an international – must be applied by the tribunal. The combination of these diverse bodies of 
law is possible because each one plays a distinct role. The law of the host state governs the 
transaction arrived at between the investor and the host state, whereas the function of 
international law is to act as a review mechanism for the impugned transaction. The conduct of 
the host state is assessed by reference to the standards set out in the investment treaty.162 
Still, the fact is that most investment treaties do not contain an express choice of law 
clause.163 The second part of article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that in the absence 
of an agreement the tribunal shall apply the law of the contracting state party to the dispute 
(including its rules on conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 
Thus, this provision establishes that the law chosen by the parties constitutes the applicable law 
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and, in the absence thereof, that the tribunal should apply the law of the host state and the 
relevant rules of international law. Arbitrators’ recourse to both laws is mandatory. 
Even though national law may be relevant for dealing with certain issues, the fact is that 
tribunals rely mostly on public international law. This is the logical consequence of the fact that 
investment tribunals are mandated to determine whether the respondent state has breached its 
obligations under the applicable investment treaty. Sometimes, however, the analysis of whether 
a treaty obligation has been breached first requires an analysis of the existence of a contract 
breach. The annulment committee in Vivendi v. Argentina noted that ‘whether there has been a 
breach of the BIT and whether there has been a breach of contract are different questions. Each 
of these claims will be determined by reference to its own proper or applicable law – in the case 
of the BIT, by international law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the 
contract.’164 In such cases, international law is applicable to evaluate a treaty claim (e.g., whether 
the state breached an international obligation arising from an international treaty), whereas 
domestic law applies to assess a contract claim (e.g., whether termination of an investment 
contract by the host state was justified by the investors’ violation of domestic law). 165  In 
concluding that a treaty cause of action differs from a contractual cause of action because ‘it 
requires a clear showing of conduct which is in the circumstances contrary to the relevant treaty 
standard’, the annulment committee did not necessarily deny national law’s potential relevance 
to the determination of the applicable treaty standard. Indeed, it may be necessary for a tribunal 
to take into account a contract’s terms in determining whether there has been a breach of a 
distinct standard of international law, and in that case national law may be relevant because the 
contract is normally governed by domestic law.166 
Arbitrators focus stringently on the rights of the investor as expressed in investment 
agreements, making limited recourse to other sources of law. This approach leads to a shrinking 
of the sources of substantive law being considered, namely the national law, where the concept 
of public service and the public service obligations arising therefrom can be found. In Azurix v. 
Argentina, for instance, the tribunal noted that the law of Argentina would be helpful in carrying 
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out the tribunal’s inquiry into the alleged breaches of the concession contract to which 
Argentina’s law applied, but added that it was only an element of the inquiry because of the 
treaty nature of the claims.167 Ultimately the decision failed to effectively address the obligations 
that resulted from the fact that this was a public service according to the laws of Argentina. The 
tribunal interpreted the respective rights of the parties under the concession contract but without 
testing that interpretation against the applicable law, downplaying the critical role of national law 
as the source of the rights comprising the investment.168 Other awards also narrowed down the 
object and purpose of investment arbitration to the analysis of investment treaties, overlooking 
the extensive legal framework applicable to the provision of water services. In both 
Suez/Interagua v. Argentina and Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, the tribunal acknowledged that ‘an 
analysis of this investment dispute must begin with an understanding of the legal framework of 
the concession (…) since that framework is an important source of the rights, obligations, and 
expectations of the parties to the dispute’.169 Still, arbitrators did not seem to extract any relevant 
consequences from a merely perfunctory analysis of the Argentine Water Law. The same can be 
said about Biwater v. Tanzania, where the tribunal barely addressed the lease contract and the 
legal obligation imposed on the investor to maintain safe drinking water in the city. 
In SAUR International v. Argentina the tribunal seemed to pay more attention to national 
law in the resolution of the dispute. Analysing the investment treaty, the tribunal acknowledged 
that it had to take into account the Argentinian legal system, including the concession contract 
and all other contracts related to the investment, which were all subject to the laws of Argentina, 
and the applicable principles of public international law.170 On the relationship between these 
different sources of law, it stated that they should not be ranked according to hierarchy but rather 
speciality – each question should be governed by the rules most suited to its nature. Therefore, 
the international responsibility of Argentina should be assessed pursuant to the investment 
agreement and the applicable principles of public international law; whereas the non-
performance of the contract, the administrative intervention of public authorities, or the 
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rescission of the contract should be analysed under the light of Argentinian law. 171 The award 
made several references to the national legal framework and seemed more willing to take into 
account its provisions when assessing the legality of the measures adopted by the respondent 
state. While the tribunal ultimately decided that Argentina had adopted a series of expropriatory 
measures and breached the standards of fair and equitable treatment, the arbitrators seemed to be 
more aware that the conformity of such measures also had to be checked against the local legal 
environment that surrounded the intervention of the Argentinian state. 
Another unsettling aspect of the case law on water concession contracts is the lack of 
references to their main source: the concession contract. The origins of investment arbitration lie 
in public international law instruments between sovereign states. However, the fact that 
investment arbitration is founded on public international law and state consent does not mean 
that the underlying investment contract and the domestic law of the host state become irrelevant. 
Inversely, investor-state arbitration is intricately connected to both.172 Besides overlooking the 
applicable national law, arbitrators have also been paying little attention to the primary source of 
the investment relationship: the concession contract. Concession contracts are not ordinary 
commercial contracts. They have different goals and contents, deeply associated with the 
promotion and protection of public interests. Hence, the procedure for their conclusion is 
distinct, frequently requiring ministerial, administrative, or legislative authorisation before 
becoming binding. These bureaucratic procedures are an indication of how public interests are a 
fundamental element of the contract.173 Because water concession contracts are deeply associated 
with public concerns, they contain express references to the public service obligations of the 
concessionaire (and investor). Furthermore, concession contracts frequently contain a choice of 
law provision. If this clause refers to national law, then national legislation, including rules on 
public services, is evidently applicable. 
In Azurix v. Argentina the respondent state repeatedly argued that all of its actions 
complied with the concession agreement and the regulatory framework. The tribunal noted that 
contractual breaches by a state party or one of its instrumentalities would not normally constitute 
expropriation. Whether one or series of such breaches could be considered to be measures 
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tantamount to expropriation would depend on whether the State or its instrumentality had 
breached the contract in the exercise of its sovereign authority, or as a party to a contract. In 
considering each of the grounds which the claimant had advanced, the tribunal had to assess 
them from the perspective of possible breaches of the investment treaty and of whether they 
reflected the exercise of specific functions of a sovereign.174 In the end, the tribunal found that 
measures taken by Argentinian authorities prohibiting the investor from collecting tariffs in 
relation to its water and sewage operations were arbitrary because they were not based on the law 
or the concession agreement.175  
In Vivendi v. Argentina the tribunal, based on the distinction between treaty claims and 
contract claims, considered that it was not necessary to come to a definitive view as to whether 
either party had or not breached the concession agreement in order to settle the dispute.176 As a 
result, the award did not examine the contractual provisions, considering that the claims 
presented by the investor had to be assessed against the ‘independent standard’ provided by the 
investment treaty. 
The investment contract plays a fundamental role in setting the legitimate expectations of 
the investor. Frequently arbitral tribunals referring to the obligation to maintain a stable legal 
environment discuss the legitimate expectations created by contractual instruments. In both 
Suez/Interagua v. Argentina and Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina the tribunal had to assess a refusal of 
the host state to update tariffs in accordance with the terms set out in the concession contract and 
domestic legislation. While the tribunals refer several times to ‘legal framework’ in the context 
of the fair and equitable treatment clause, the awards reveal that the investor’s legitimate 
expectations were based on both the contract and the domestic legislation, and even suggest that 
the dominant element of this ‘legal framework’ was the concession contract. The tribunals stated 
that the concession contract and the legal framework of the concession ‘set down the conditions 
offered’ at the time the investor made its investment; ‘they were not established unilaterally but 
by the agreement’ between the local authorities and the investors; and they ‘existed and were 
enforceable by law’. Arbitral panels added that ‘like any rational investor’, investors attached 
‘great importance to the tariff regime stipulated in the concession contract and the regulatory 
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framework’. The expectations of the investor were included in the concession contract, a 
‘document which certainly reflects in detail the claimants’ legitimate expectations’, as well as 
those of the host state. ‘In view of the central role’ that the concession contract and legal 
framework placed in establishing the concession, the investor’s expectations that the host state 
would respect the concession contract throughout the thirty-year life of the concession was 
‘legitimate, reasonable, and justified’.177 Both tribunals concluded that the ‘persistent and rigid 
refusal to revise the tariff in accordance with the concession contract and the regulatory 
framework’ violated Argentina’s commitments under the investment treaty to treat the investors’ 
investments fairly and equitably.178 
It is surprising to notice that these awards do not go through the concession contract and 
the domestic legislation in the same detail when assessing the measures adopted by Argentina in 
order to protect the access to water of the populations. It is true that Argentina tried to justify 
possible breaches of its investment obligations by invoking the protection of the human right to 
water as a defence of necessity, thereby putting the problem at the level of international law. 
Still, arbitrators should have analysed more thoroughly the contents of the concession contract 
and the domestic legislation, as they establish the duties and obligations of the investor, namely 
the fulfilment of public service obligations. It is paradoxical that tribunals acknowledge that the 
contract and the legal framework reflect in detail the investor’s ‘legitimate expectations’, but 
ignore that same contractual and legal framework when analysing the host state’s legitimate 
expectations that the investor would respect its public service obligations. One wonders whether 
these tribunal would have addressed the question differently if Argentina had framed its 
arguments under the language of public services obligations (founded on the concession contract 
and the domestic legal framework) instead of the rhetoric of human rights. 
In Impregilo v. Argentina, as many of the measures complained of by the investor 
concerned the investment contract, the arbitral tribunal found it appropriate to examine whether 
the alleged contractual breaches could affect Argentina’s responsibility under the investment 
treaty.179 The tribunal found that Argentina, by failing to restore a reasonable equilibrium in the 
concession, breached its duty under the investment treaty to afford a fair and equitable treatment 
                                               
177
 Suez/Interagua v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, of 30 July 2010, para. 212; Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, 
Decision on Liability, of 30 July 2010, para. 231. 
178
 Suez/Interagua v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, of 30 July 2010, para. 218; Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, 
Decision on Liability, of 30 July 2010, para. 238. 
179
 Award of 21 June 2011, para. 298-299. 
47 
 
to the investor. 180  This decision acknowledges that the legal framework that surrounds the 
investment includes the national law and the concession contract. If the breach of the investment 
treaty touches upon contractual rights, then the arbitrators need to take the contractual provisions 
into account, as it is against such provisions that the legality of the host state’s measure will be 
checked. This unusual attention payed to the concession contract results from the fact that the 
claims complained of by the investor concerned the contractual relationship with the host state. 
As a result, the arbitral tribunal felt compelled to examine such contractual provisions. In most 
cases investors do not frame their case as a breach of the contract that also amounts to a breach 
of investment treaty obligations, which explains why arbitrators normally do not examine the 
concession contract in detail. One wonders if the arbitral tribunal would be willing to devote 
such attention to the concession contract if the claim presented by the investor was treated 
merely as a ‘treaty claim’. This decision highlights that the concession contract is a fundamental 
source of the parties’ obligations and that arbitrators should check the legality of the host state’s 
against those provisions, namely when respondent states argue that their measures are justified 
by a breach of the concession contract and are justified by the provisions of that same contract. 
The concept of public service has been absent from investment arbitration because it is 
stranded on domestic legislation, which has been consistently overlooked in favour of investment 
law. The inexistence of an international legal framework on ‘public services’ or on ‘public 
service obligations’ results in the scarce relevance of these provisions. A tension exists between 
national conceptions of ‘public service’ and the international logic of foreign investment, based 
on the language laid down in investment treaties. While the latter are the result of a multiplicity 
of international treaties and regulatory frameworks, the former are still deeply national. The 
regulatory framework embodying the concept of public service is found in national law, and does 
not have an international dimension. The ‘division of labour’ in international investment law has 
traditionally been as follows: investors’ duties are regulated at the domestic level, whereas 
investors’ rights are protected at the international level.181 The concept of ‘public service’ resists 
internationalisation. The idea of ‘public service obligations’ lacks an international dimension and 
is thus not contemplated by arbitrators. The Suez/Interagua v. Argentina and Suez/Vivendi v. 
Argentina cases illustrate the existent asymmetry between the legitimate expectations of the 
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investor – which are grounded not only on the investment treaty but also on national law and 
contractual instruments – and the legitimate expectations of the host state, which find no 
protection on investment treaties and are frequently overlooked in arbitration proceedings 
because of the predominance of international law. 
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CHAPTER III – INFUSING PUBLIC INTERESTS INTO WATER 
CONCESSION ARBITRATIONS 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the principles and legal frameworks that 
traditionally supported investor-state arbitration did not ensure the protection of the public 
interests associated with water services. Despite recent reforming efforts, the current system is 
still far from properly balancing the goals of investment protection and promotion with the 
public function of these services. 
Water concession contracts are not trivial investments. The nature of the interests 
associated with these services requires a special legal framework, embodied in carefully 
designed concession contracts but also investment treaties that allow for the consideration of the 
specific problems that may arise from foreign investments in the water industry. Furthermore, 
those in charge of arbitrating these disputes should have a clear understanding of the public 
interests that surround water concession contracts. According to Truswell, a consistent treatment 
of water contracts can emerge from three different aspects: the awards of international 
investment tribunals; the subjection of water services to special provisions within investment 
treaties; and the inclusion of special provisions in contracts governing water services.182 In our 
opinion, due consideration of the public interests in water concession disputes requires concerted 
action in two different domains: changing the investment arbitration mechanism, by promoting 
the transparency of proceedings and the participation of non-parties; and changing the regulatory 
framework that underpins investments in water services. Combined, these improvements are 
likely to infuse public interests into water concession arbitrations. 
 
5. Changes from Within 
 
The current investor-state arbitration system is clearly unsatisfactory. A reform is 
necessary so as to strike a proper balance between public policy concerns and investment 
promotion and protection. The procedural flaws identified previously perpetuate a system and 
culture that is antagonistic to the proper consideration of public policy issues in investment 
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disputes.183 The system needs to be reformed under penalty of dying before it can survive its 
growing pains. 
 
 5.1 Transparency of Proceedings 
 
In the last few years there has been a dawning recognition that conducting investor-state 
arbitrations out of the public eye is problematic in democratic systems. Several modern 
investment treaties provide for greater transparency throughout the different stages of the 
proceedings. The implementation of these new instruments in practice provides useful insights 
for the reform of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Furthermore, in April 2014 UNCITRAL opened a 
Transparency Registry for investor-state arbitrations, which makes a broad range of additional 
awards and pleadings available.184 The Transparency Registry has been established under the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State Arbitration, effective as of 1 
April 2014.185 
Concerns over lack of transparency have also been addressed by the ICSID to some 
extent. Still, there is room to improve and render ICSID arbitration proceedings more 
transparent. Even though the existence of a new case is posted on the ICSID website with 
reference to the name of the parties and the subject matter of the dispute, this information is 
clearly scarce and says little about the contours of the case. Differently, some investment treaties 
now provide for greater transparency regarding the initiation of arbitral proceedings. Article 
29(1) of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty186, for instance, provides that the 
respondent shall, after receiving the notice of intent and the notice of arbitration, promptly 
transmit them to the non-disputing party and make them available to the public. Similarly, article 
2 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provides that once the notice of arbitration has been 
received by the respondent, each of the disputing parties shall promptly communicate a copy of 
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the notice of arbitration to the repository of published information. Upon receipt of the notice of 
arbitration from the respondent, or upon receipt of the notice of arbitration and a record of its 
transmission to the respondent, the repository shall promptly make available to the public 
information regarding the name of the disputing parties, the economic sector involved and the 
treaty under which the claim is being made. Furthermore, the first paragraph of article 3 adds 
that, subject to article 7 (confidential or protected information) the notice of arbitration, the 
response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of defence and any 
further written statements or written submissions by any disputing party shall be made available 
to the public. The ICSID Rules could be amended in the same vain so as to make sure that this 
information is made available on its website, allowing the general public to have a more precise 
idea about the existence of the dispute and the public interests that might possibly be involved. 
Furthermore, even after the 2006 amendments, the access by the public to arbitration 
documents and hearings is still handled rather restrictively under the ICSID arbitration rules. In 
the framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), public access to 
arbitration documents is much easier. In a 2001 Statement, 187  the Free Trade Commission 
clarified that ‘nothing in the relevant arbitral rules imposes a general duty of confidentiality or 
precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, 
Chapter Eleven tribunals, apart from the limited specific exceptions set forth expressly in those 
rules’. Therefore, the NAFTA parties agreed to make available to the public in a timely manner 
all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven tribunal, subject to redaction of: 
confidential business information; information which is privileged or otherwise protected from 
disclosure under the party’s domestic law; and information which the party must withhold 
pursuant to the relevant arbitral rules, as applied. The parties reaffirmed that disputing parties 
may disclose to other persons in connection with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted 
documents as they consider necessary for the preparation of their cases, but they shall ensure that 
those persons protect the confidential information in such documents. This clear stance in favour 
of transparency appears to have affected treaty practice in a certain way, in that a new generation 
of investment treaties is more open to the publication of documents. Article 29(1) of the 2012 
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, for example, provides that the respondent shall, after 
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receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to the non-disputing party and make 
them available to the public: pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a 
disputing party and any written submissions, minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, 
where available; and orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal. Similarly, article 3 of the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency requires the following documents to be made available to 
the public, subject to some limitation on confidential or protected information: the notice of 
arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the statement of 
defence and any further written statements or written submissions by any disputing party; a table 
listing all exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and witness statements, if 
such table has been prepared for the proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written 
submissions by the non-disputing party (or parties) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts 
of hearings, where available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal. 
There is also a growing trend in favor of allowing public access to the arbitral hearings. 
Within NAFTA, Canada, the United States, and Mexico have agreed that investor-state hearings 
should be open to the public. 188  Similarly, article 29(2) of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty provides: ‘The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and shall 
determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements. 
However, any disputing party that intends to use information designated as protected information 
in a hearing shall so advise the tribunal. The tribunal shall make appropriate arrangements to 
protect the information from disclosure.’ Pursuant to article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on 
Transparency, hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument shall be public. 
Where there is a need to protect confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process, 
the arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements to hold in private that part of the hearing requiring 
such protection. The arbitral tribunal shall make logistical arrangements to facilitate the public 
access to hearings (including where appropriate by organizing attendance through video links or 
such other means as it deems appropriate). However, the arbitral tribunal may, after consultation 
with the disputing parties, decide to hold all or part of the hearings in private where this becomes 
necessary for logistical reasons, such as when the circumstances render any original arrangement 
for public access to a hearing infeasible. Oral hearings of investment arbitrations should, in 
                                               
188
 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement, “Decade of Achievement”, San Antonio, July 16, 2004, 
available online at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/Statement2004_e.asp. 
53 
 
principle, be opened to the public. This allows the general public to have access to the 
proceedings, even if just as observers and not amici. According to Parra, the time may have 
come for ICSID ‘to reverse the general rules regarding access to documents and attendance at 
hearings in arbitration cases’ and, more particularly, ‘ICSID might amend its Regulations and 
Rules to provide for the publication of all documents generated in proceedings, unless or to the 
extent decided otherwise by the arbitrators, and for tribunals to have full authority to allow third 
parties to attend or observe hearings (eliminating a party’s right to veto such attendance or 
observance of hearings)’.189 
Finally, it is also necessary to increase transparency as regards the publication of final 
awards. Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules still makes the publication of the award 
dependent upon the consent of the parties. While this provision requires the centre to include in 
its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal, the truth is that only access to have 
a thorough vision of the proceedings and how public interests where handled by respondent 
states and the panel of arbitrators. The full text of arbitral awards should be accessible to the 
general public, subject to the necessary safeguards for the protection of confidential business and 
governmental information. This is possible in most cases and requires only certain exceptions to 
the rule which may be practically accomplished by deleting parts of an award.190 This would 
enhance the effectiveness and public acceptance of international investment arbitration, as well 
as contribute to the development of a public body of jurisprudence. Recent trends in investment 
treaties also indicate a greater willingness to make arbitration awards publicly available. In the 
NAFTA context, states or the investor may unilaterally make the award public.191 Article 29(1) 
of the 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty mandates publication of all orders, awards 
and decisions of the tribunal. The publication is subject to essential security exceptions and to 
special procedures that can be invoked at a disputing party’s request to protect confidential 
information. Similarly, article 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency provides that orders, 
decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal shall be available to the public, subject only to some 
limitations regarding confidential or protected information. An amendment to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules providing for the mandatory publication of complete awards in a similar 
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fashion would be a welcome development and contribute to enhance the transparency of ICSID 
arbitration. 
Even if the ICSID decides not to amend its Arbitration Rules in the near future, there is 
another avenue that host states may pursue to provide for greater transparency in investor-state 
arbitration: the inclusion of specific provisions on investment treaties and investment agreements 
such as concession contracts. Indeed, negotiating parties can agree on transparency provisions 
directly in the concession contract or indirectly in the investment treaty, on how to conduct any 
subsequent arbitrations. Host states should strive to include in these instruments a public right of 
access to information, subject only to strict limitations regarding genuinely commercially 
sensitive information. The existence of public interests associated to investor-state arbitrations 
should lead to a presumption of publicity of the proceedings, unless confidentiality can be 
justified, in whole or in part.192 
Overall, investor-state arbitrations regarding water concession contracts call for a greater 
measure of transparency. These are not trivial commercial disputes. While confidential business 
information must be protected, when a crucial public good like water is involved there should be 
information to the public about the terms of the privatisation and its impact on the society. 
Greater transparency enhances the public’s ability to follow pending investment disputes and 
understand the growing body of investment arbitration awards. This would lead to more 
responsible contracting by companies and governments, and contribute to more consistent 
rulings by arbitrators, thereby reinforcing predictability and legitimacy of international law.193 
Instilling greater transparency into the process would also provide for a measure of 
accountability for the arbitrators, giving them greater incentive to consider the public’s interest. 
 
 5.2 Participation of Non-parties 
 
Investor-state arbitration has also been accused of lack of openness to the wider society.  
Third party participation in water disputes is – like in other disputes involving public goods – 
essential for the protection of public interests. Past experiences have shown that partnerships in 
the water sector should not simply be viewed as bilateral relationships between the public and 
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the private sector as they generate strong interest from consumers and communities.194  The 
principle of public participation should be better balanced against other rationales of the 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
The last years have witnessed an undeniable shift in investment arbitration toward greater 
tolerance of third-party participation. Amicus curiae participation is becoming a fixture in 
investor-state arbitration in cases implicating important public policy considerations. As a result, 
critiques of the system based on lack of transparency and openness to third party participation 
are diminishing in tone.195 The 2006 amendments to the ICSID rules endowed the system with 
greater transparency and facilitated the participation of civil society in disputes. Still, the ICSID 
Rules do not go far enough in ensuring a full application of the public participation principle. 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules should allow for broader participation rights that go beyond the 
mere possibility to make written submissions. Timely disclosure of key documents such as 
briefs, final awards, and transcripts will assist persons submitting amicus briefs to be more 
efficient in making their own submissions. Proper disclosure of information is vital for better 
participation, and the disadvantages are minimal.196 
Another important change would be the deletion of the right of parties to oppose the 
access of amici curiae to hearings. ICSID tribunals should have the power to decide for 
themselves whether to permit amici curiae access to hearing. This could be achieved simply by 
removing the prerequisite of ‘the consent of the parties’ mentioned on Arbitration Rule 32(2), or 
by introducing criteria similar to those in Arbitration Rule 37(2) concerning written submissions. 
The removal of the veto power of the parties would increase the sphere of activity of amici 
curiae. 197  An evolution of the rule in this sense seems unstoppable in the long run. 198  As 
mentioned, article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency establishes the general principle 
that hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument shall be public, subject only to 
a few limitations. 
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Measures conducive to greater transparency and openness of investor-state arbitration can 
be included in arbitration rules but also in investment treaties and concession contracts. During 
the negotiation of these instruments host states should insist on the incorporation of express rules 
allowing for amicus curiae participation and granting third parties with access to the documents 
and hearings. In case of a dispute the parties – namely, the investor – will not have the possibility 
of refusing public participation since the procedure to be applied by the tribunal is determined 
not only by the applicable rules of the arbitration institution, but also those defined by the state 
when expressing consent to arbitration in an investment treaty.199 While this method of attaining 
amicus curiae participation is not as all-encompassing as amending the ICSID Arbitration Rules, 
it has an incremental effect.200 
The expansion of the participatory rights of amici curiae should, naturally, be made with 
caution. Still, if concerns regarding confidential information and the cost and time-efficiency are 
properly taken into account, it seems possible to strike an appropriate balance between 
preserving the traditional features of arbitration and enhancing the systemic legitimacy of state-
investor dispute resolution. 201 Most, if not all, potential costs of increased transparency can be 
avoided if tribunals carefully exercise their discretion in the fields of transparency and third party 
participation. And, because the parties choose their arbitrators and trust them to rule on the 
substantive issues, there is no convincing reason why tribunals should be unfit to properly 
manage these procedural competence as well.202 
 
6. Changes to the Regulatory Framework 
 
There is an ongoing clash between the investment obligations of host states and the 
public service obligations associated with essential services like water provision. International 
investment agreements impose investment obligations on host states but do not preclude their 
responsibility for the protection of public interests associated with these services. The conclusion 
of concession contracts does not render the concept of ‘public service’ useless, as public service 
obligations may also be discharged by private operators. Water services still serve public 
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interests but are carried out by a private company, subject to the control and monitoring of the 
state. Public authorities are required to readjust to the new situation created by privatisation by 
developing new mechanisms to ensure both the protection of investments and of citizens’ rights. 
The need to change the existing legal framework so as to reflect non-investment concerns 
has been underlined by several authors from the perspective of human rights. Since private 
operators assume some of the state’s duties regarding the provision of water services, they 
necessarily take on some of the responsibility for the accompanying human rights obligations. 
One way to enforce these responsibilities is to factor them into contracts and investment treaties. 
The tribunal’s ability and willingness to take account of public interests depends on the 
applicable law. While international investment agreements are a primary source of rights and 
obligations of the parties, they cannot be wholly separated from the contract or from domestic 
law. In fact, the investment treaty and the investment contract are mutually reinforcing.203 Host 
states need to reshape both legal instruments so as to make it clear that investment in water 
services is not only governed by the investment treaty but also by the concession contract and the 
domestic legislation, which contain public service obligations. One way of enhancing the 
visibility of these obligations in investor-state disputes, thus emphasising their binding nature, is 
to expressly include adequate provisions in concession contracts and investment agreements. 
 
 6.1 Refinement of Concession Contracts 
 
The concession contract is the centrepiece of the regulatory framework. Because of their 
distinctive subject-matter and of the long-term nature of the relationship, investments in the area 
of public services require a long and intricate negotiation between the investor and the host state, 
which is embodied in the concession contract and related contractual documents. This means 
that, even where investment treaties between the host state and the state of the investor exist, 
they are not self-sufficient. Investment contracts such as concession contracts are still frequent, 
and the existence of investment treaties did not render them obsolete. In fact, these legal 
instruments are probably the most effective investment protection instruments available because 
they allow investors to draft terms tailored to specific investment needs. Differently, investment 
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treaties are much more general and vague, and in some cases might be unsuited to particular 
investment projects.204 
Host states should be aware of the central role played by the concession contract in 
shaping the contours of the relationship with the foreign investor. Therefore, before entering into 
any Public-Private Partnership for the provision of water services, states should introduce the 
appropriate regulatory framework in the concession contract.205 Careful design of concession 
contracts would allow the host state to clearly set out in the contract in which situations it would 
be allowed to intervene in the protection of relevant public interests, and through which 
measures.206 Concession contracts should reflect a careful allocation of responsibilities between 
host states and private operators. Both parties should be sensitive to the implications of the 
contract and share the costs for the fulfilment of the relevant public service obligations at the 
outset of their relationship.207 
States should strive to give more prominence to public service obligations in the 
concession contract. This legal instrument puts forward the specific regulatory framework of the 
relationship between grantor and concessionaire, describing their rights and obligations. More 
than that, a concession contract has a dual nature of both contract and an act of the sovereign.208 
As a result, these contracts should be treated as public policy mechanisms rather than merely 
private contracts.209 Concession contracts should clearly set out the rights and obligations of the 
concessionaire, including the fulfilment of public service obligations. According to 
Petersmann210, if Argentina had included human rights obligations in the concession contracts, 
the subsequent investment disputes might have been avoided. Similarly, the inclusion of 
provisions on public service obligations would shape the concessionaire’s legitimate 
expectations decisively. The inclusion of clear and unequivocal references to public service 
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obligations in the concession contract might contribute to elevate the profile of these obligations 
and avoid the recourse to the language of human rights, which has been articulated by respondent 
states with little success. The argument according to which arbitrators shy away from 
considering human rights due to their lack of experience in this specialised field of law211 would 
stand no longer.  In fact, investment arbitrators are far more used to interpreting and applying 
contractual provisions than human rights treaties. In this case the state’s defence would be based 
on contractual provisions detailing the existence of certain public service obligations binding the 
foreign investor, making them unequivocally applicable to the dispute. 
 
 6.2 Recalibration of Investment Treaties 
 
Another important avenue for balancing investment protection and the protection of 
public interests associated with water services is through careful drafting of investment treaties. 
This second approach might be even more successful because, as demonstrated above, arbitrators 
rely mainly in the text of investment treaties. 
International investment agreements generally focus on investment promotion and 
protection, lacking any references to public interests. While states want to promote foreign 
investment, they also have an interest in pursuing other values, including protection of the 
environment, public health, human rights, and labour rights. As a result, when concluding 
investment treaties, states often seek to advance the interests of several different 
constituencies.212 Given the need to reach a compromise, frequently international investment 
agreements convey the obligations of investors using rather broad and general language. Still, 
they should not restrict the state’s right (and obligation) to supervise and regulate the provision 
of public services. Investment treaties should make clear that investor accountability is as 
essential as investor rights.213 Public concerns such as the protection of consumers’ rights, labour 
rights, and of the environment should be included in investment treaties. Reacting to several 
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decisions that were perceived as too restrictive of state’s regulatory powers, several states have 
decided to revamp their investment agreements. This entails a ‘reappraisal’ or ‘recalibration’ of 
international investment instruments.214 These legal instruments need to be drafted in a way that 
strikes a better balance between the objective of protecting foreign investment and the other 
interests and values which foreign investment could impact. The goal is to clarify the state’s 
rights and duties to regulate and protect public interests.215 Better drafting should provide clearer 
guidance to arbitration panels, ensuring greater predictability and coherence in the interpretation 
of treaty terms.216 
This trend has been especially noticeable as regards the perceived conflict between 
investment standards of protection and human rights protection. States have been urged to make 
sure that they retain adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect human rights when 
negotiating and concluding investment agreements.217 Host States should act in a preventive 
manner, in line with appropriate due diligence standards, allowing them to comply both with 
investment standards of protection and obligations of a diverse nature.218  
 
 6.2.1 Provisions on Public Service Obligations 
 
There are several different tools available so as to strike a balance between investment 
obligations and non-investment concerns. The most obvious option is to insert specific 
provisions on the investment agreement defining the rights and obligations of the parties and 
ensuring unequivocally that states can regulate in order to achieve public policy goals. In the 
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specific case of water services, this would be achieved by giving greater visibility and 
prominence to public service obligations, thus reinforcing their binding nature. As investment 
tribunals rely essentially on the text of the investment treaty, the inclusion of express provisions 
within the legal instrument would dissipate any possible doubts over the direct and necessary 
applicability of these obligations. However, the scope of international investment agreements is 
wide, including activities and sectors that are quite dissimilar. Most investments are made in 
areas which are not subject to public service obligations. When states negotiate investment 
agreements they have in mind a wide range of sectors and activities, and therefore use broad and 
general language to govern them a systematic and coherent manner. Still, it would be possible to 
include a special chapter on public service obligations, which would only be applicable to the 
types of investments defined therein. 
 
 6.2.2 Provisions on the Applicable Law 
 
The legislative technique described above entails the inclusion of specific provisions on 
public service obligations in the text of the investment agreement itself. A similar result can be 
achieved through the inclusion of provisions in the investment agreement referring to national 
laws where these obligations are enshrined. The goal here is to make it clear that those provision 
are a part of the applicable law. As discussed above, the legal framework for investments in 
water services consists of the relevant host country legislation, its system of regulations, and the 
concession agreement. While the concession agreement stipulates key provisions governing the 
relationship between the host country and the investor, the source of many of those concession 
provisions is set out in the law and regulations of the host country. Frequently investment 
agreements contain clauses requiring that investments be ‘in accordance with host state law’. 
These clauses emphasise the relevance of domestic law for investment disputes, thereby offering 
a possibility to take non-investment concerns into consideration.219 If host states want investment 
tribunals to balance investor rights with the essential character of public services they can draw 
their attention to the express applicability of any legal provisions that impose public service 
obligations. National law is already applicable, as discussed previously, to most investor-state 
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disputes. The problem is that most tribunals have been focusing primarily on international law, 
namely the investment agreement. This requires host states to make an effort to include clauses 
that underline the applicability of national laws, clearly highlighting that the provisions of the 
treaty do not in any way exclude the application of national legislation governing water services. 
This would function as a reminder for arbitral tribunals that investment in water services is 
subject to a vast legal framework, including general laws, consumer protection rules, and 
administrative provisions. 
 
 6.2.3 Exception Clauses 
 
Another technique that host states can use is to include an exception clause in the 
international investment agreement. This type of clause is used to exclude particular sectors or 
subject matters from investment agreement obligations or to permit measures necessary to meet 
specific objectives, including protecting essential security interests, public order, human health 
and the environment.220 The purpose of these clauses is to make it clear in the investment treaty 
that states should be exempted from liability when they adopt measures to protect public welfare. 
Rather than directing a tribunal to balance the competing objectives of investor protection 
against non-investment concerns in determining whether the treaty has been breached, exception 
clauses direct the tribunal to balance specified objectives in determining whether a given breach 
is excused.221 The tribunal must assess the state’s motives and whether there is a public welfare 
component to the practice as well as the effect of the state practice.222 A growing number of 
investment treaties includes exception clauses to ensure that investors’ rights are balanced 
against the regulatory concerns of host states, such as the protection of human health or of the 
environment. 223  Some expressly state that non-discriminatory regulatory actions that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, and the environment, do not constitute expropriation. This language makes it significantly 
more difficult for investors to convince the tribunal that a regulatory measure is a breach of the 
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investment treaty.224 Similar clauses could make an explicit reference to measures adopted by the 
host state in order to protect public interests associated with water provision, clarifying that such 
measures do not constitute a breach of the investment treaty. Exception clauses render the 
treaties more flexible and at the same time restrain the interpretational leeway of tribunals. Still, 
they leave room for judicial scrutiny as they are subject to the usual interpretational rules of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.225 
The combined effect of these measures is likely to instil greater consideration for non-
investment concerns – namely, greater enforcement of public service obligations – in the 
resolution of investor-state disputes. While new ways of drafting investment agreements can 
inspire investment tribunals to take into account non-investment legal provisions, it is still too 
early to assess the true impact of recent investment treaties on investment law and practice. 
Furthermore, it is a tremendously slow and demanding effort to revise and amend the plethora of 
investment agreements currently in force. The large majority of current investment agreements 
will remain in force for several years. As a result, problems of articulation between the essential 
nature of water services and investment protection are likely to continue for some time. 
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CHAPTER IV – CONCLUSIONS 
 
The marketisation of water management deeply transformed the role of the state in the 
provision of these services. When states delegate the management of water services on a foreign 
company, the foreign investor is frequently protected by investment treaties and entitled to 
submit any disputes to an international arbitral tribunal. Through the looking glass of arbitration 
awards one can realise the substantial consequences that the international investment regime has 
been producing on water markets. Different issues have been surfacing in recent decisions. 
Problems of procedural nature include the lack of transparency and public participation of 
arbitral proceedings. From a substantive perspective, arbitral panels have been focusing on the 
logic of international investment law without taking into account non-investment rules arguably 
applicable to disputes, specifically a purported human right to water. The qualification of water 
services as public services, and the specific obligations that follow flow that status, have also 
been overlooked. The complexity of water disputes calls for a re-assessment of the interaction 
between investment law, national law, and investment contracts.  
Despite recent reforming efforts, the current system is still far from properly balancing 
investment protection with the public function of water services. Due consideration of the public 
interests associated with these disputes requires concerted action in two different domains: 
changing the investment arbitration mechanism, by promoting the transparency of proceedings 
and the participation of non-parties; and changing the regulatory framework that underpins 
investments in water services. First, investor-state arbitrations regarding water concession 
contracts call for a greater measure of transparency. While confidential business information 
must be protected, when a crucial public good like water is involved there should be information 
to the public about the terms of the privatisation and its impact on the society. Instilling greater 
transparency into the process would provide for a measure of accountability for the arbitrators, 
giving them greater incentive to consider the public’s interest. Second, the principle of public 
participation should be better balanced against other rationales of the investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanism. The ICSID Arbitration Rules should allow for broader participation rights 
that go beyond the mere possibility to make written submissions. Proper disclosure of 
information and the grant of access to oral heraings are vital to increase civil society’s 
participation in water disputes. 
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While international investment agreements are a primary source of rights and obligations 
of the parties, they cannot be separated from the concession contract and domestic law. Host 
states should reshape both investment contracts and investment treaties, making it clear that 
investments in water services are not only governed by international investment law but also by 
the concession contract and the domestic legislation, which impose public service obligations. 
Both legal instruments should reflect a careful allocation of responsibilities between states and 
private operators. Such amendments are likely to contribute to strike a proper balance between 
public and private interests in the water industry. 
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